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CHAPTER

1

KENNEDY AND THE NEED FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE
Introduction

In

January 1961, when John

to support

foreign

those enemies than

many

day, he believed strongly
F.

Kennedy

and defend the Constitution

and domestic, he had

George

F.

in

his

mind a very

America's reliance on

Like

to arrest the

many

some

of

politicians of his

advance

of

communism

economic, diplomatic and, when required,

his contemporaries,

its

enemies,

the American doctrine of containment articulated by

political,

means. Unlike many of

all

different conception of

of his contemporaries.

in

hand and swore

of the United States against

Kennan, a strategy designed

around the world by

raised his right

Kennedy

vast nuclear arsenal

military

did not believe that

was equal

to the task.

He

believed, rather, that the foremost threat facing the Western world

was

communist insurgency, not overwhelming conventional or nuclear

force.

Therefore, he reasoned, America required a strategy that could meet a broad

range of challenges throughout the spectrum of

John

F.

Kennedy's

belief in the

product of several influences. The

need

first

was

for a flexible

among

in

the American people that the war

had doomed Truman

politically.

response was the

the Korean War.

that America's inability to win a decisive victory

feeling

1

conflict.

He had been

in

Kennedy believed

Korea, coupled with a general

was an unnecessary

sacrifice,

Congress during the McCarthy

Development of an Appropriate
Lehman, "Protracted Insurgent Warfare: The
World,
"
Counterinsurgency: U.S.-Sov.et ™cy>n *eT£d
U S Doc me in Guernlla Warfare and
Heath and Company, 1989), 121-123.
Schultz, etal. (Lexington, MA: D.C.
1

Christopher

M

Richard H.

1

era and had seen first-hand the perils for a

politician

who

perceived as soft on communism. Part of Kennedy's
political

allowed himself to be

belief, then,

arose from

pragmatism.

More
advisors.

important, however,

In

1951, during his years

new conception

returned with a
strategy.

were

of

What he had witnessed

military strategy that relied

in

the Senate,

how
in

experiences and those of his closest

his

Kennedy

visited

Vietnam.

He

best to execute a global containment

Southeast Asia was the

on conventional weapons and

failure of

French

tactics against a

dedicated communist insurgency. From that point forward, Kennedy's rhetoric
consistently stressed the

need

for

a

new

level of capability,

a strategy that would

allow for a flexible response to communist expansion without resorting to nuclear

war.

"In practice",

enough.

It

Kennedy argued

in

1959, "our nuclear retaliatory power

cannot deter Communist aggression which

atomic war.

It

is

wars... In short,

it

guerrilla forces.

It

too limited to justify

cannot be used

in

so-called brush-fire

cannot prevent the Communists from nibbling away

fringe of the free world's territory or strength."

2

Kennedy was arguing

development of a counterinsurgency (hereafter abbreviated
in

not

cannot protect uncommitted nations against a Communist

takeover using local or

communism

is

at the

for the

CI) capability to fight

the Third World.

Kennedy would

often find himself fighting an uphill battle

create a viable CI capability. Most of his inner

circle

in

his quest to

shared his views, as did

Speeches Made During His
John Fitzgerald Kennedy, A Compilation of Statements and
(Washington, D C: U.S. Government
Service in the U S. Senate and House of Representatives,
Era: U.S.
S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency
Printing Office, 1964): 288, quoted in Douglas
(New York: The Free Press, 1977), 53.
Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present
2

2

several prominent officers

the U.S. Army. But, as a review of his early policies

in

by his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff points
capability

in

the face of fifteen years of

momentum aimed

at creating

weapons." 3 He would have

out,

momentum

he had to develop

the defense establishment,

in

an "unchallengeable, absolute

to

change the mindset

Department, as well as reorganizing and retraining

this

much

of

its

capability" in nuclear

of his

Defense

units for CI.

Kennedy's conviction that such a capability was imperative was bolstered

by events of the
that

1950s

Communism was on

victorious

and

late

Sputnik.
territory,

period,

the march.

Nasser regime

Israel.

In

In

that served to heighten

in

1956 the Soviet Union had supported a

In

Egypt against the combined power of

1957 the Soviets had beaten America

capturing

France

space by launching

into

its pilot

and embarrassing the United States.

America had witnessed communist insurgencies

doubt and the insurgency

communist

Britain,

1960 the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet

and Malaya. While the outcome
in

guerrilla activity

guerrilla actions in

calls to

an already acute public fear

of the uprisings

in

in

4

In

the

same

Laos, Vietnam,

Southeast Asia was

for concern.

Cuba added a sense

of urgency

The
and

startling

in

of

success of

credibility to

develop counterinsurgency capability as a weapon

in

still

Malaya had been defeated, the sheer quantity

was cause

Cuba

Kennedy's

the arsenal of

containment.

3

General

July 62, NSF,

L.L.

Lemnitzer,

M&M, Box

"Summary

319,

of Military CI

Accomplishments Since January, 1961", 21

JFKL

Khrushchev, Castro and
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble":
77-78.
Kennedy, 1958-1964, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997),
4

3

Taken

together, the events of the

anticommunism and created a

political

1950s fanned the flames

climate that

made

dedication to the

strategy of containment an imperative for those seeking office.

environment provided

and he

capability,

fertile

ground

capitalized

on the

for

of domestic

Kennedy's appeals

for

Such an
a

fact during his presidential

new

level of

campaign. His

attacks on the Eisenhower administration's focus on nuclear weapons, at the

expense

of conventional forces,

campaign.
global

5

had been steady and severe throughout

Kennedy's claim that America needed new

communism was

well received

tactic.

The

the problem and provide a solution carried great weight

The suspicions

of the

deepened when, on January
sacred wars speech

in

wars. ..and they march

stem the

tactics to

ability to

in

both describe

the election of 1960.

American public and the young President-elect
1961, Nikita Khrushchev delivered his so called

6,

which he intoned that "The Communists support
in

tide of

by most Americans. He used the doctrine

an example of such a

of flexible response as

his

the van of the peoples fighting for liberation."

6

just

Kennedy

ordered his top foreign policy advisors to "Read, mark, learn and inwardly digest"
the Soviet Premier's words.

intended to

It

was

make containment a

Khrushchev's rhetoric

in his

clear that from the beginning that

priority,

and on

his terms.

inaugural address with his

Kennedy

He answered

famous promise

that the

any
U.S. would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support

5

Russell

F.

Weigley, History of the United States Army, (Bloomington,

Press, 1984), 526.
6

Fursenko and

Naftali, 78.

4

IN:

Indiana University

friend,

oppose any foe

words, Kennedy ushered

phase

of the Cold

in

back up

not only a

days

his earliest

in office,

his rhetoric with action,

was

for placing

counter-guerrilla forces."

James Reston

of

innovations on March

1,

Frontier" for America, but also a

be characterized by resistance

Kennedy demonstrated

new
to

that

he intended
in

to

the

his first directives to his national security staff

more emphasis on the development

of

8

The

New

York Times noted the

1961, writing "There

was a

stir

caused by Kennedy's

Reston apparently found the
its

"flap"

military strategy."

its

9

unnecessary, arguing that every new

military strategy.

note Kennedy's emphasis on

Washington today

big flap in

over reports that the Kennedy Administration was changing

administration reviews

With those

and he immediately began making waves

Among

"examine means

to

liberty."

fronts.

defense establishment.
to

"New

War, one that promised

communism on many new
From

7

assure the survival and success of

to

flexibility,

He went

on, however, to colorfully

saying that "Neither the President nor the

Secretary of State wants to use a sledge

hammer to

kill

a

10
fly,"

and he

paraphrased from Kennedy's early speeches regarding the need

for

a limited-

warfare capability. Reston described Kennedy's belief that America could not

7

Ibid.;

8

Blaufarb, 53.

McGeorge Bundy,

JFKL; Roger Hilsman, To Move
9

3 February 61, NSF,
a Nation, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967): 413.

"National Security Action

James Reston, "Another

Big Controversy

Memorandum Number

Over Very

61.
10

Ibid.

5

Little",

The

2",

New

York Times,

1

March

rely

on

its

nuclear arsenal to prevent communist encroachment

World (Reston
to

in

the Third

used Indochina as an example). The author then went on

tellingly

say that "accordingly, the President has already ordered more strenuous

training for anti-guerrilla warfare

and no doubt more

diverted to improving the capacity of the

more
the

effectively."

full

11

Despite the

What Kennedy
dimension

entangled
the

did in his early

in

to

brushfire

wars

in

Reston apparently

What

failed to

implications of that

new dimension
became deeply

corners of the globe. For John

came

Laos, where communist insurgents,

in

really three stories.

is

Kennedy,

F.

for

supremacy

and the Royal Government (supported by the United

follows then

see

days was nothing less than add a new

supported by North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union, vied
with neutralists

war

policy.

The

many

be

to fight this kind of

the ensuing years, as America

all in

of these entanglements

first

new

to U.S. military strategy.

would become clear

armed services

latter realization,

significance of Kennedy's

scientific brains will

The

first is

States).

the development of

post-war counterinsurgency as a tool of containment and the lessons derived

from Truman and Eisenhower's forays
post-war history of
especially between

political turmoil in

into CI operations.

The second

Laos and American intervention

1955 and 1960. The

third is

administration's counterinsurgency efforts

in

is

the

efforts,

a case study of the Kennedy

Laos and how they

reflected

Kennedy's strategy of containment from 1961-1963.
I

will

attempt to explain the

political,

diplomatic and operational

emphasis on the
considerations that drove Kennedy's decision making, with

_
11

ibid.

6

following questions:

What was

took over

How had

1961?

in

know about

CI

and how

was

fighting?

a

fly"

In

knowledge

Laos, and

in

how

all

did

without "using a sledgehammer?"

In

been developed? What
affect

of those questions,

Laos

affect the

Laos, as

in

much

domestic and international

in

in

Kennedy's successors would

was

another.

Both Kennedy and

his

development of CI

Laos meet

his goal "killing

that question

The insurgency

is

important

quickly that

in

in

one

Laos,

a small part of a larger regional
Intelligence

military special operations forces in Laos, therefore,

later interventions in

did his theories

Kennedy learned

communist movement. Operations by the Central

a primer for

enemy he

formed a house of cards, where action

place might have profound effects
find,

how

of

the post-Kennedy Cold War.

of Southeast Asia,

politics

in

The answer to

and foreign interventions

Kennedy

did

American doctrine? Did

other words, did Kennedy's CI program

to CI operations

when Kennedy

Laos? Did he know what kind

situation in

Given the answers to

about CI play out
doctrine?

that doctrine

did his

Kennedy understand the

the state of American CI doctrine

Agency

(CIA) and

can be seen as something of

Vietnam, Afghanistan and Central America.

successors drew a myriad of lessons from

earlier CI

operations. Laos, for example, certainly influenced the political and military

leaders

who executed American

political

and

military

policy in Vietnam.

Not

all

of the diplomatic,

lessons learned were necessarily good ones.

therefore, conclude with a brief discussion of

have set the nation up

how America's

for failure in neighboring

7

Vietnam.

I

will,

foray into Laos

may

The

historiography of post-war counterinsurgency and American

operations
arrived

in

in

Laos has come

in

three discernible waves.

the late 1960s and 70s, and focused

operations

in

Laos.

on the subject

is

The

like

Bernard

first

of these

on American

attention

group to emerge from the

characterized by books

and Arthur Dommen's
background

first

its

The

first

wave

of scholarship

Anatomy of a

Fall's

Crisis

Conflict in Laos, sought to explain the Laotian political

that brought about

American

have been motivated by the ongoing war
authors sought lessons from the earlier

Charles A. Stevenson's The

intervention.

in

A second

group seems

neighboring Vietnam, as

crisis to illuminate

End of Nowhere: American

to

many

the current one.

Policy

Toward Laos

Since 1954 and Martin E. Goldstein's American Policy Toward Laos are good

examples

of this.

In his introduction,

Stevenson promises

proper perspective. His analysis of American policy

"seems a

series of mistakes," but he

men

difficult

He

with

also

tells

makes an

is

to put

in its

damning, arguing that

effort to

it

cast policy makers as

decisions to make, often between several undesirable choices.

the reader that the mistakes of Laos

may

hold important lessons.

Goldstein, a political scientist, wishes to examine not what

why. Particularly he wants to uncover America's stake
parties to the conflict

1962.

Laos

were able

in

happened

Laos, and

to reach the bargaining table in

Laos, but

in

how

Geneva

all

in

12

of Neutralization, (New York: Praeger
Arthur J Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics
of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 960-61 (Garden
Publishers, 1964); Bernard B. Fall, Anatomy
Charles A. Stevenson, The End o[Nowh e e:
City NY- Doubleday and Company, 1969);
MA: Beacon Press, 1972); Goldstein,
Policy Toward Laos Since 1954, (Boston,
12

,

American
passim.

8

These works are
and,

in

and

its

characteristic of the period

Stevenson's case especially, point out
financial costs to

its

in

that they criticize policy

human

cost

Americans, while stopping short of

among

similarly criticizing

Kennedy. Such gentle treatment of Kennedy may be a product of
heroic status

among many

of the authors. Another explanation,

forces a researcher to read his sources very carefully,

is

Laotians

his continuing

and one

the fact that

many

these early examinations were written by members of Kennedy's own
following his assassination,

President's reputation.

were anxious

to protect, or

Roger Hilsman's The

Administration of John F.

Kennedy and

Days are good examples

of this approach.

Politics

even

build,

and Foreign

Arthur M. Schlesinger's
13

The authors

staff

Many

of these authors, particularly those

administration,

end up sounding

have suffered. With respect
for

like

in

who,

Policy in the

A Thousand

of this

who served

of

the late

first

wave tend

not to directly address Kennedy's theories about CI, at least not with a

eye.

that

the

critical

Kennedy

apologists for any failures the President

to the implementation of CI

and foreign

intervention,

example, these authors tend to promote the notion that Kennedy had the

idea about CI and

how

it

could be used as a tool of containment.

may

Any

right

failures of

resistance to
the President's CI doctrine are generally seen as the byproduct of

the change by a stubborn, conventionally minded defense bureaucracy.
Still

another group of books that

falls

roughly into the

first

wave

of

studies. Like Jeffrey
scholarship on Southeast Asia were the Vietnam province

Foreign Policy in the Administration of
Roaer Hilsman To Move a Nation: The Politics of
Company, 1967); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
John F Kennedy, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and
(Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin
A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House,
13

Company,

1965).

9

Race's

War Comes

specific provinces

to

Long An, these books examine the

and regions

Johnson and Nixon years, but
Kennedy's

in

Vietnam.

As

Their focus

is

usually

in

war on

the

background chapters frequently review

their

policies in Vietnam.

14

effect of the

such, they frequently pass judgment on his CI

programs. Race, for example, argues that Kennedy and his successors simply
failed to

grasp the power behind the communist movement

America misunderstood the enemy,

wrong

tactics.

While books

like

in his

in

Southeast Asia.

view, and therefore responded with the

Race's study the provinces

in

Vietnam, their

indictments of American policies to combat communist insurgency

Asia are relevant to the struggle

in

of

doctrine,

more

books arrived that attempted

sometimes

often to

to

Southeast

Laos.

Following the end of America's involvement

wave

in

in

the Vietnam War, another

to illuminate the

demonstrate why or how

it

development

of CI

failed in the recent conflict, but

draw lessons from past operations, sometimes using Laos and

Vietnam as examples. Douglas Blaufarb's The Counterinsurgency Era and Larry
Cable's Conflict of Myths: The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine and
the Vietnam are the best examples. Blaufarb provides copious detail on the

background of both insurgency and counterinsurgency, analyzes the lessons
operations

in

the Philippines and Malaya and looks hard at

have translated CI lessons
path, with

more

operations

14

in

into doctrine

and

practice.

attention paid to lessons learned

how

well

War Comes

to

Long An: Revolutionary

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972).

10

Americans

Cable follows a similar

and unlearned from CI

Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaya and,

Jeffrey Race,

of

Conflict in a

interestingly,

Vietnamese Province,

"the

Banana Wars"

CI efforts

in

in

Vietnam

A growing

Central America.

specifically, usually focusing

subset of this genre examines

on the

failure of the

defense

establishment to properly balance conventional and unconventional approaches
to the insurgency.

Andrew

analysis that

falls into this

experiences

in

Krepinevich's The

Army and Vietnam

is

an excellent

category. Krepinevich suggests that, despite painful

Southeast Asia and the Army's pledge of "no more Vietnam's",

the defense establishment has remained resistant to change and has, after
learned few of the lessons of

its

past.

15

While these historians focus on CI

doctrine, they tend to touch only briefly on

When

all,

Kennedy

they do focus on Kennedy's decisions on CI,

in

the telling of a larger story.
usually with an eye

is

it

toward how they affected Vietnam, rather than Laos.

The

third

the operatives

wave

of writing

on Laos and CI came

who executed American

CI programs

in

in

the 1990s.

As many

Southeast Asia

of

retired,

they began to write books about their experiences. Most of these are
characterized by a limited view of operations. While

many

of the earlier

works

tackle policy and doctrine, these later works examine execution on the ground,

and

illustrate

how

high-level decisions affected low-level operations.

of the

these books are harshly

critical

usually excellent books,

some seem

Kennedy

Many

of

administration and, while they are

motivated by bitterness over the fate of the

indigenous personnel the authors had a hand

in training.

Perhaps the best

pair

of American
Blaufarb passim; Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development
University Press, 1986);
Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War, (New York: New York
Hopkins
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns
15

University Press, 1981).

11

to

come

out of this genre are Robert Conboy's
amazingly detailed account

Shadow War: The

CIA's Secret

War in Laos and Roger Warner's

Shooting at the

Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos. Again,
one must read
this set of

books

carefully

because, while they are great

for providing perspective

as to how American intervention played out on the ground, they are
sometimes
colored by personal dissatisfaction with the outcome of operations,
as
with

James

CIA.

E. Parker's

Codename

Mule: Fighting the Secret

This latest group of historians

by covering both the background

ground meant
this sort

to deal with

that to

closest to the

to the crises in

tell

its

beginnings

what happened

War in Laos

theme

of this

for the

essay

Laos and the actions on the

those crises. Their scope

cover U.S. intervention from

Many go beyond

comes

the case

is

is

in

very broad; most books of

1955

until its

end

after the U.S. left Laos.

in

1973.

Even these

detailed accounts, however, tend to offer only limited analysis of Kennedy's CI

theory and doctrine. The analyses they offer on the subject, moreover, are often
culled from the secondary sources of their predecessors,
In

attacking

my

subject,

numerous primary sources

I

will

draw from many

to arrive at

some

most notably

Blaufarb.

of these sources as well as

conclusions of

my own

about CI

lessons learned and unlearned and describe how CI doctrine was developed and

how

16

it

played out

in

Laos.

In that

respect, this essay

is

something of a synthesis

War in

Laos, (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press,
1 995); Roger Warner, Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos,
(South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 1996); James E. Parker, Codename Mule: Fighting the

James Conboy, Shadow War: The

CIA's Secret

Another, smaller body of literature that coincided with the final
wave reflected, somewhat, the trend towards social history in that its subject was not CI or
lessons learned from operations in Laos, but rather, the exploitation and abandonment of the
Hmong by American politicians and advisers. For a good example of this, see Jane Hamilton1942Merritt's Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos,

Secret

War in Laos

for the CIA.

1992, (Bloomington,

IN:

Indiana University Press, 1993).

12

of the three

waves

1963.

break new

I

will

and how

it

of scholarship

trail,

I

as they

believe, by focusing

Kennedy

affected operations.

what he thought or knew about many
presidency, including the crisis
tell

relate to the

in

us what Kennedy was being

on Kennedy's thinking about CI

few personal documents that

by

his advisors.

We can then

look at

intervention

in

us

Laos and,

ultimately,

Post

From these documents we
what he

some newly

argue that Kennedy's thinking on CI had much

American

tell

of the subjects that occupied his

conclusions about what he thought. Using
will

years, 1961-

Laos. There are documents, however, that can

told

can derive what Kennedy knew.

left

Kennedy

to

did to

draw some

declassified documents,

do with the outcome

I

of

Vietnam.

War Lessons

Counterinsurgency operations were not new when Laos and Kennedy
together arrived on center stage

in

1961. They were not Kennedy's invention,

despite his reputation as their leading benefactor. Modern American

counterinsurgency operatives can trace
special operations forces that have

from the French and Indian
exploits of Rogers'

Rangers

their lineage to intelligence

engaged

War through
in

in

covert, counter-guerrilla missions

today. Their legacy includes the

OSS

famous

colonial America, Francis Marion during the

American Revolution, Mosby's Raiders during the
Marauders and the

agents and

during World

War

Civil

War, and

Merrill's

17
II.

Warriors of the U.S. Army," Airman: The
Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, "Special
42-44.
Official Journal of the Air Force 5 (November 1961),
17

18

Mao

Foreign Language Press, 1972), 232Tse-tung, Six Essays on Military Affairs, (Peking:

253.

13

During the Cold War, insurgencies have generally been armed,
revolutionary struggles against a government or political ideology.

developed as

efforts

redistribute land

to

by communist-trained insurgents

and wealth

to the peasantry,

combat a non-communist

in

They

the third world to

and use the support

or pro-west government.

is

to fight a long series of guerrilla

exhaust and demoralize the enemy.

18

The most

this

garnered

Most communist-led

insurgencies followed the doctrine of protracted war articulated by
the main principle of which

typically

striking

Mao

Tse-tung,

engagements

example

to

of a true,

comprehensive insurgency might be Ho Chi Minh's so-called people's war

in

Vietnam. By appealing to the impoverished majority of Vietnamese peasants
with promises of land

dedicated and

and economic reform, Ho was able

resilient following that ultimately

technologically superior foe.
fighting

In

so doing, he demonstrated the

social revolutionary nature of people's war, effective CI
social realms, as well as the military.

destruction of an entire insurgent
objective.

In

muster an amazingly

wore down a numerically and

a true insurgency with conventional weapons and

economic and

to

movement,

Direct action, therefore,

is

19

difficulty of

tactics.

Because

engages the

CI has as

its

rather than a single

merely part of the equation.

of the

political,

object the

enemy

unit or

20

America
the two decades following the Second World War, however,

had no coherent CI

doctrine. With the exception of the CIA,

few agencies

Foreign Languages Press, 1973),
Chi Minh, Selected Writings, 1920-1969, (Hanoi:
chp 2. 2.
passim, but especially 94-95, 195-208; FM1 00-20,
19

Ho

20

Headquarters, Department of the Army,

FM

100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.:

1990), chp. 2.

14

USGPO,

outside the Department of Defense played, or cared to play,

Presidents

and the

Truman and Eisenhower presided over

Philippines.

The

British,

promised a bright future

had no doctrine

for CI,

for the

CI operations

meanwhile, engaged

Malaya and Singapore. The success

much

in

of a role in CI.

in

Greece,

counterinsurgencies

to contain

containment of communism. For America, which

some

these early operations taught

early lessons about

communism and

the insurgencies

it

inspired.

War as

Some

real

21

The Greek
war CI

it

of those

lessons misled American leaders about the nature of insurgency and the
costs of CI.

in

of these early post-war CI operations

the type of small wars the U.S. would encounter throughout the Cold

sought

Italy

Civil

testing ground.

War, from 1947-1949, provided the U.S. with

Based on the

operation only insofar as

it

was an

definition provided

effort to

above,

it

its first

was a

post-

CI

support the Greek government

against a communist insurgent. American intervention

was extremely

limited

and

involved primarily logistical support to conventional operations by Greek forces.
Little effort

was made,

at least

on the

part of the Americans, to win the support of

the people or answer any of the indictments of the insurgents with preemptive
social or political

programs

of their own.

themselves carried out most of the

More

difficult

importantly, the

work and

all

Greeks

of the combat, under the

see Theodore
For concise discussions of the significance of post-war CI operations,
Operations, (New York:
Shackley The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency
Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon
Reader's Digest Press, 1965): 8-9, and John Prados, President's
Gulf, (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks,
Covert Operations From World War II Through the Persian
Gazette in 1954 provide detailed
1996) 220 Two articles published in the Marine Corps
They have been anthologized in
contemporary assessments of two of the operations examined.
York: Praeger Publishers,
N Greene ed The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, (New
21

Thomas

15

inspirational leadership of a

Greek

hero, Field Marshal Alexander Papagos. U.S.

involvement was hardly decisive.

The Greek government defeated
measure, because the insurgents,
their forces... and

"in

the communist insurgents,

search of a quick

victory...

sought to defeat the regular Greek Army

war... ignoring the concept of protracted war." 22

By doing

squandered any advantage they may have held because

in

in

large

conventionalized

head-on

so, the insurgents

of the psychological

value of guerrilla operations. By standing and fighting a conventional war, they
virtually

guaranteed

The Greek
and

intensity

their

own

defeat.

23

operation, therefore, provided few valuable lessons as to the

difficulty

of counterinsurgency operations.

may have done more harm

than good.

In

a report to

The lessons

it

did teach

McGeorge Bundy

in

November

1961, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council

George

McGhee draws

C.

Entitled "Counter-Guerrilla

lessons from past CI operations for use

Campaigns

in

in

Vietnam.

Greece, Malaya and the Philippines",

the report cites the leadership of U.S. General Van Fleet and the practice of
letting U.S.

victory.

He

advisors go forward with combat units as decisive factors
scarcely mentions the Greeks at

efficiency of the

GNA as a

result of informed

all,

22

the

except to laud "the increased

Greek leadership and

Malaya, see Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S.N. Mans, "Victory
see Colonel J.C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War.
1962).

in

On

In

of U.S. advice

Malaya";

On

Greece,

Blaufarb, 23.

23
Ibid.

Mao articulated

available to the

his theory of protracted struggle in 1938,

Greek insurgents.

16

so presumably

it

was

and

training."

bolster

Flush with an easy victory, the Truman Administration did

its ability

successors
its

24

conduct CI operations and the lessons

to

may have

led

them down the wrong

path.

it

The U.S.

CI doctrine and capability, even as communist guerrillas

appeared

to

be learning from

their

power

to the

CI.

Armed

Southeast Asia

and

by the new government

violently

when

whom

they had helped

with a resistance network leftover from the

state, running

they

post-war elections.

Japanese

occupation, they seized control over the central Luzon region and ruled

were a separate

develop

1946 the Huks, a native resistance

In

new government following

Essentially, they felt betrayed

bring to power.

failed to

25

group that fought the Japanese throughout WWII, reacted
to lose

its

rebellion in the Philippines provided another challenge

another easy victory for American

began

in

for

to

mistakes extending their resistance to the

French and what Ho called "U.S. imperialism".

The Huk

saved

little

it

as

if it

schools and providing other forms of

governmental services.
Early efforts by the Philippine government to counter the

entirely military

Through

and bore

and

trial

error,

light infantry units,

enemy base

little fruit

until

they modified their tactics and strategy.

the Philippinos "[discovered] the superior effectiveness of

strike at
the use of specialized scout squads to reach into and

areas, [and] the reliance on

armed

McGhee, "Counter-guerrilla Campaigns
21 November 61, p OF, Subjects, CI, JFKL
24

25

George

Huks were

C.

Ho, 95-95.

17

civilians

in

under

military

Greece, Malaya and the Philippines",

supervision to defend their

own homes." 26

operations did not defeat the

Military

Huks, however.
In

1950, with the insurrection

named Ramon Magsaysay

commanded 10,000
sharply

in full

bloom, Philippine President Quirino

Secretary of National Defense. Magsaysay had

Philippino resistance fighters during the

War and was

of the government's efforts to defeat the Huks.

critical

an ambitious and decidedly unconventional approach, both

He embarked on

within the military

and

without.

Among
their

his reforms,

he demanded that the Philippine army

treat civilians in

areas of operations with respect, declaring that "every soldier had two

duties:

first,

to act

people; second to

as an ambassador of good
kill

or capture the Huk."

military's sensitivity to civilians

effectiveness of what would

27

will

Magsaysay's insistence on

was, perhaps, the

come

to

from the government to the

first

be known as

his

demonstration of the

"civil

military operations".

Magsaysay's American advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, writes
in his

memoirs

that

he encouraged the Philippine leader

suggesting the use of the military to assist
could.

By doing so he would eliminate many

exploited to gain local support.

26

civilians

28

of the

to

expand on

this

theme,

whenever and however they
problems that the Huks

Magsaysay agreed, and embarked on a

civic-

Blaufarb, 28.

27
Ibid.,

30.

Mission
Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's
York: Harper and Row, 1972), 70.
28

18

to

Southeast Asia, (New

works program

that should

would characterize

have stood as an example

later efforts to

combat people's war.

Most importantly, Magsaysay
of land reform.

Magsaysay

for the nation building that

Under the auspices

instituted rent controls

fundamental program

instituted a small but

of the

Economic Development Corps,

and provided the landless with a means

to

redress legal complaints against their landlords through the military's Judge

Advocate General's Corps. He also promised land on the

any

of the

Huks who were

willing to lay

promised government assistance
running. While only

succeeded

250 Huk

in its effort

until

their

arms.

families accepted

Magsaysay's

in

economic hardship

offer,

was taken by

it

he

the program

created.

Greece, American intervention was

U.S. provided advice and economic aid, both of which

to earn

settled,

to

to alleviate the chief complaint of the insurgents:

the Philippines, as

decisive action

Once

Mindanao

these families got their farms up and

inequitable distribution of land and the

In

down

island of

made

the Philippine government,

and keep the support of

its

29

limited.

The

a difference, but the

Magsaysay

in particular,

people. While the happy coincidence of

Lansdale's ideas and Magsaysay's leadership proved an effective combination,
the victory

was

primarily a Philippino effort.

Deadly Paradigms,
had

little

effect

perhaps the

prior to

Magsaysay's

on the Huk insurgency.

first

30

As

arrival

D. Michael Shafer points out in

on the scene, American

policies

The operation was, nevertheless,

successful CI operation of the Cold War.

It

encompassed a

of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy,
Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure
231-239.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988),
29

D

30

Ibid

,205

19

total

effort

on the part of the government

to dismantle not just the forces of the

insurgent enemy, but also his base of popular support.
projects

and

and land

actively

bevy

redistribution, using military

pursued positive

American CI

Lansdale's input, the Philippine victory

as had the
victory,

earlier

engaged

in civic

works

resources to assist the populace,

civil-military relations.

of lessons for the developers of

It

It

should have provided a

doctrine.

came almost as

But despite

easily for the

Greek one. Americans misinterpreted the reasons

Americans
for the

and therefore reinforced the wrong lessons.

The American
impression that CI

military

and

intelligence

was cheap and

would often prove not

to

effective.

communities came away with the
It

may have been

the

be the former. "The element of good luck

latter,

but

finding a

Magsaysay", Douglas Blaufarb argues, "was not always understood as what

was

— sheer good

the

US was

still

luck."

31

McGhee's 1961

report to

Bundy

not drawing appropriate lessons from

stresses the importance of the U.S. advisory

Magsaysay, followed by building
factors leading to success.

32

civilian

The

U.S.

role,

its

it

it

affirms the notion that

operations.

McGhee

then the leadership of

support for the government as important

moved

on, satisfied with

its

undeveloped,

but apparently successful, CI program and unwilling or unable to grasp the true
catalysts behind the success of operations

In

in

Greece and the

Philippines.

1948, the British began to have insurgency problems of their

own

in

Greece and the

Philippines, the insurgents in the British colony

were motivated by communist

ideology. Also like those operations, the British

Malaya. As

31

in

Blaufarb, 40.

20

met

The

with great success.

reasons.

First,

approach

to insurgency.

were

it

British

experience

in

Malaya

is

important for two

revealed the importance of a comprehensive, systematic

to a CI operation.

Second,

it

As seems

illustrated

to

how

important local conditions

have often been the case, U.S.

officials

took

the lessons they liked from the Malaya experience and discarded those they
disliked.

The

situation the British faced in

States had, or would encounter
first,

and most important

Malaya. They ran the

need

factor

local

in its

was

Malaya was unlike most

battles against

communist insurgency. The

the fact that the British were

government and the

that the United

military,

in

charge

and therefore had no

What

to route orders or policies through local authorities for approval.

authorities

were involved worked

the

an important

British,

invaluable, especially

elements involved

in

distinction.

when one

with their counterparts

for the British, rather

in

That sort of

considers the

simplicity in

difficulty

command was

U.S. officials had working

such places as Laos. Direct authority over many

the British CI effort played a decisive role

British

formed only about a

was

local

than with the support of

in their

Second, the backbone of the Malaysian Communist Party and

war against the

in

of the

success.

its

guerrilla

the country's Chinese minority. This population

third of

the whole, and

commanded

little

allegiance

among

the general population. Furthermore, they were a readily identifiable minority,

concentrated along the island's west coast and separated from the rest of the
island by a chain of mountains. This geographic

British to

32

focus their efforts

McGhee,

"Counter-guerrilla

in

and

social isolation allowed the

one place and against one ethnic group.

Campaigns

in

Greece, Malaya and the Philippines".

21

Third, the

British

had controlled Malaya long enough

British civilians

provided

on the

that there

was an extensive cadre

island with detailed local knowledge.

critical intelligence

These people

and early warning.

Fourth, the British placed responsibility for suppressing the insurgency

the hands of a war committee

composed

of both

civil

and

activity,

maintaining sensitivity to the needs of the local population.

The

success

in

civil-military

cooperation and

Malaya. The cooperation of

civil

British the luxury of separating insurgents

principles of CI operations.

received

seems

to

little

Finally, the

external support

have garnered the

and

from

while

British

have a

proved crucial to

military authorities

civilians,

one

their

allowed the

of the basic

Malaysian Communist Party, importantly,

in their efforts to

right

it

in

military authorities.

This organization allowed for a rapid response to insurgent

long-standing tradition of

of

overthrow the

lessons from Malaya.

centrality of the British political effort to the overall CI

He

British.

33

McGhee

stresses the

campaign and the good use

of intelligence to isolate the insurgents, thereby removing

them from

power, the populace. Despite these revelations, however, he

still

their

base of

fails to

recognize the crucial importance of the insurgents' inherent weaknesses and the
coordination of

civil

and

military operations in the British victory.

While the lessons of the
retrospect,

33

British

experience

in

Malaya seem clear

American observers apparently recognized some but not

Headquarters, Department of the Army,

D C U S Government

FM 90-8,

Printing Office (hereafter

in

others. For

Counterguerrilla Operations, (Washington,

USGPO), 1986); Sam C. Sarkesian,
Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam, (Westport,

Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era:
Myths, 71-95.
CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 55-75; Cable, Conflict of
34

McGhee,

"Counter-guerrilla Operations In Greece,

22

Malaya and the

Philippines",

JFKL.

example, the Army's
Guerrilla Warfare

initial

doctrinal

manual

for Cl-style operations,

and Special Forces Operations, published

the experience of the

Army

Special Forces

in

in

FM 31-21

1958, reflected

Korea, where they were created to

organize partisan resistance to the communists, rather than to operate as part of

a unified CI campaign. "Using

[this]

model," argues Richard Downie, "the Special

Forces concentrated on the mission of organizing

enemy

and coordinating the

lines

efforts of

friendly guerrilla forces behind

these guerrillas with U.S.

conventional force operations." 35 Based on the Army's published doctrine, the

lessons of

civil-military

cooperation had not been integrated as late as 1958 into

a service-wide CI doctrine, nor had the defense establishment seen

fit

to tailor

a

force specifically organized and trained to execute CI operations. While the

McGhee
tactics

report

acknowledges the importance

and socio-economic reform" and

that "there

leadership, integrated both politically and

American CI doctrine was slow

militarily",

to institutionalize

misinterpreting the importance of

some

military

is

no substitute

in

for strong

the evidence suggests that

these important lessons, while

of his earlier ones.

With confidence born of easy victory

American

of "the inter-relationship of military

36

Greece and the

marched on through the 1950s and

into

Philippines, the

the Kennedy years

without a coherent counterinsurgency doctrine. Throughout the post war years,
particularly

under President Eisenhower, the country and

35

Richard D. Downie, Learning From Conflict: The U.S. Military
the Drug War, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 53.

in

its

armed services

Vietnam, El Salvador

and

Greece, Malaya and the Philippines"; Department
Forces Operations, (Washington, D.C.:
of the Army FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare and Special
(Washington,
USGPO, 1958); Department of the Army, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations,
36

McGhee

DC: USGPO,

"Counter-guerrilla Operations

in

1962); Downie, 52-63.

23

remained caught up

enough

to deter

in

the idea that the threat of massive nuclear retaliation

communist aggression. When forced

covert, or Cl-style capabilities, the

than the

military.

and paid

little

to

have been overlooked
of ideology

is...

its link

in limited

a soldier expected to join
in. ..official

Vietnam,

appear

is

to

be a national

There

to the support of the local population.

war. "The

CIA man

who has

certainly

and win, the

in

of...

contests]

like

inability to

will

comprehend

to

preceding

article implies,

the article appeared,

new hero
Notably

Cuba, Laos and South

that sincere

There would

men can

believe

in

not necessarily rise up against a dictator such

at least instituted

seems

shift

the Brooks Brothers

military-political battles...

some

basic reforms."

have been a kind

somewhat

37
.

of blindness to ideology

of the lessons learned about CI. That blindness

contain

The key

most lessons taken regarding CI

to the ideological nature of the contest.

or that a people

Dr. Castro,

in,

appreciations

any reference

communism,

some

and

in

being replaced by a soldier with a switch knife." he wrote, "The

absent

as

of choice, rather

1961, a London Times correspondent wrote a piece on Kennedy's

towards increased capability
suit is

weapon

to the lessons of successful civil-military operations.

were the importance
In April,

often the

operations requiring

CI doctrine continued to stress conventional forces and tactics,

heed

seem

pieces that

CIA was

into

was

does seem

to be,

as the

ethnocentric. Nevertheless, by April,

Kennedy appeared

to

be a

firm believer

communism and was making aggressive moves

in

in

when

the use of CI to

to inculcate his

several
philosophy throughout his administration. Fortunately, there were

London Times Correspondent, "James Bond
London Times, 27 April 61.
37

24

Qualities for the U.S. Guerrilla Fighter",

The

important proponents of CI capability around the President,

who was

himself a

strong believer.

Counterinsurgency doctrine

had looked

at the

end

of

World War

published doctrine and what there

from post war lessons learned

viewed CI as a
forces.

In

in

in

1959 and 1960 looked very

II.

That

was had

is

to say, there

yet to

show much

very

how

it

little

positive influence

the Philippines and Malaya. America

still

mission that could be carried out by conventional military

military

special cases, like the

communist insurgencies

Philippines, the doctrine said, conventional units could

enemy.

smaller, lighter units to address a guerrilla

Forces could be used to raise
soldiers

was

similar to

and money remained

In

Greece and the

in

be reorganized

some cases

the Special

American

local resistance to conventional forces.

at the center of

its

CI thinking.

As

into

yet,

American

CI doctrine neglected non-military approaches and failed to recognize the

importance of addressing the roots of insurgency. No mention was made

1958 CI manual
in

a unified CI

of

fundamental economic or

effort.

Proceeding from

political

this baseline,

promoting a doctrine of flexible response promised

The

fact that

test just

the

reform as a key ingredient

Kennedy's

rhetoric

to revolutionize CI doctrine.

Kennedy took over with major insurgencies burning

and Vietnam would

in

how well Kennedy understood

in

Cuba, Laos

CI himself.

Kennedy's Increased Emphasis on Limited War

The documents
"limited war",

of the early

Kennedy

administration

make

it

clear that by

Kennedy meant "insurgency" and almost always communist

25

insurgency at

The documents

that.

also suggest that

advice as to what constituted insurgency and
In

planning

February 1961, Robert H. Johnson, a
staff,

issued his

first

report on

reinforce the President's position,

conceptual basis

The

how

implication

Pentagon

still

best to fight

it.

member of the NSC's

policy

Key National Security Problems. As

if

to

he highlighted the "grossly inadequate

that holdovers from the

Eisenhower administration

favored a strategy predicated on massive

in

the

retaliation, rather

than

response.

flexible

At one of his

when he asked

first

NSC

his staff,

meetings Kennedy served notice of

"what are

we

February

3,

1961

.

Its

content

was

marked the beginning

Kennedy

To
Military

of

Memorandum

straightforward; he ordered the

Defense and "other interested agencies"

emphasis on the development

his priorities

doing about guerrilla warfare?"

followed up that meeting with National Security Action

to

"examine means

of counter-guerrilla forces."

an emphasis on CI

that

40

39

He

#2, dated

Department

of

for placing greater

This

would endure

for

memorandum
most

of the

administration.

steer the administration

in

the right direction,

Kennedy appointed a

Representative to the President, choosing for the job General Maxwell D.

Taylor, something of a legend

in military circles.

He had been one

of the

NSF,
Robert H. Johnson, "Key National Security Problems", 10 February 61,
Memoranda, JFKL.
38

39

Hilsman, To

40

McGeorge Bundy,

M&M,

plenty of

our various programs relating to the developing areas..." 38

for

is

Kennedy received

Move a

Nation, 413; also quoted

"National Security Action

in

26

Staff

Blaufarb, 53.

Memorandum Number

JFKL.

M&M,

2",

3 February 61, NSF,

pioneers of airborne operations
Airborne Division and

He had

later

in

the

commanded

commanded

the 8

th

Army and had

the 101

Army

st

fought with the 82

Airborne Division

in

nd

World War

II.

Korea and been Chief of Staff of the

in

Army. He was the consummate paratrooper

in

an era when paratroopers were

considered cutting-edge, the vanguard of the new

military.

Eisenhower's strategy of reliance on a massive nuclear

He had opposed

strike capability to the

point of resigning his commission to protest conventional force cuts.

He was

among

all,

the

first

perspective of

to

embrace the theory

many

in

of "flexible response." Best of

Kennedy's inner

expertise with cultured intelligence.

circle,

He was a

he combined

the

Academy's superintendent) and

Performing Arts. General Taylor
his military to

be— smart,

flexible

capability

1

961

.

It

was

critical in its first

stated,

"It is

41

Point,

and

later

Kennedy wished

of everything

his belief that a flexible

41

response

National Intelligence Estimate, dated January 17,

now widely

held that,

it

in

is

order to prevent such a paralyzing

necessary to have

limited

war

so that comparatively minor threats can be countered with

appropriate means. But

been

West

and unquestionably competent.

choice [nuclear war for a limited cause]
capabilities,

of his military

director of the Lincoln Center for the

was emblematic

Kennedy's administration echoed

from the

published author, an academician

(he spoke Japanese, had taught Spanish and French at

became

all

also

in

recent years limited war capabilities

declining rather than rising... There has

Prados, 219-222; Weigley, 526.

27

in

the

West have

been a trend toward the reduction

of budgetary allocations for the modernization

forces."

42

The
warfare

revelation that

was

remained

Western defense budgets had neglected

followed by an admission that there

be developed. What,

to

intervention?

And,

How

tellingly for

Departments

but they had been

left

and much of

emphasis on

McNamara

CI.

it

one

little

time."

43

work cut out

Clearly,

for him.

if

how

to

for

could the U.S. prevent the Soviets
his

work on those questions immediately,

reflected older thinking

and the former President's

24, 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert
his recollections of the last

President-elect.

On

meeting

the subject of limited war,

of Eisenhower's advisors (Secretary Gates) had argued

any number

of limited

war

situations at

the defense establishment believed that, Kennedy had his

Gates' thinking reflected the doctrine of the time, implying

so arguing, both Gates and the contemporary doctrine

as Kennedy

that

war from becoming a general war?

as the manuals did that conventional forces could carry out
In

war

information from the Eisenhower

that "The United States [could] handle

one

limited

a limited war theater? Kennedy and

memo with

between Eisenhower and the
recalled,

into

On January

sent Kennedy a

McNamara

limited

and Defense set
precious

was much about

limited

example, constituted grounds

the climate of the times,

of State

administration,

for

one prevent a

did

from introducing nuclear weapons

lack of

and mobility of limited-war-capable

did, heavily influenced

by

political

limited

failed to

war missions.
see

28

war

considerations.

1961-1963, Volume
Foreign Relations of the United States, (Hereafter FRUS),
7.
Crisis, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994),
42

limited

VIII,

Laos

Kennedy's emphasis did not mean instantaneous transformation,

On

however.

February 14, 1961, National Security Staff

Komer sent a memorandum

to

W.W. Rostow

member Robert W.

complaining

that,

despite the top

"limwar" threats coming from Laos, Vietnam,

Congo and Lebanon, "most

Pentagon planning and

military aid

on the concept
scale....

DOD

certainly

most of our

of meeting major overt local aggression

people tend to concentrate on

in

Magsaysay had explained

problem of getting the Philippino army
restricting

its full

He goes on

use

to bluntly

in

combat

into

to

shape

when James Cross
Army

CI operations, rather than

him

W.W. Rostow,

"his paradoxical

to fight effectively

to permit his achieving

warn Rostow

based

multi-division

that found the

non-military aspects. Cross tells the study's recipient,

Philippino President

still

problems, rather than

in April

Defense Analysis published a study

continued to stress military action and organization
its

on a

anti-guerrilla

on preventive medicine..." 44 More evidence followed
of the Institute for

programs are

a

that

double

and then

in

politically stable victory."

that the lesson of past CI operations

is

that

"an ex-insurgent, disillusioned, reformed, and rehabilitated can be a valuable
citizen, while

and a

relatives

dangerous

for

governed than

43

Ibid
44

,

some

a dead insurgent usually leaves behind him
long, lingering bitterness... few things are

a government that depends
to

in

more

and

politically

any way on the consent of the

suppress irregulars and rebels by

military action

alone

..45

24 Jan 61, p.10.

Robert W. Komer, "Limited

War Threats",

14 February 61, NSF,

JFKL.
45

friend

James Cross, 19

April 61,

NSF, M&M,

Staff

Memoranda, JFKL.

29

M&M,

Staff

Memoranda,

Cross's findings, and his warnings to Rostow,

came

at

a time of policy review for

the Kennedy administration, and told them what they believed to be true
already,
that there

In

needed

to

be a

significant shift in both thought

May 1961 Robert

F.

,

Kennedy sent

his brother

Communist

Guerrilla/Terrorist Operations".

communist command and

how to

fight

seated

in

them.

It

a copy of a 1960 Army

It

Suppression

a detailed analysis of

is

control of insurgent operations

argued

action.

A Handbook for the

report entitled "Counter Insurgency Operations:
of

and

in

the third world and

causes of revolutionary warfare are

that, "the basic

the politico-psychological and socio-economic instability of the

country... the guerrilla/terrorist

movement

is

the result, not the cause of the

problem... the anti-guerrilla/terrorist operations must aim at severing the

from

their

base within the people, and must,

therefore,

emphasize

enemy

political,

psychological and economic actions... the guerrilla must be opposed by his
actions... a military operation alone

operations of a significant nature."

has never been shown to extinguish

46

The

report runs for over 80

insurgencies around the world.

COMINTERN'S

Its

of these

protection system
strategic hamlet

46

Robert

F.

in

communist

fomenting and directing

most important chapters, however, appear as

appendices that provide examples of tactics

One

role in

guerrilla

pages and,

addition to the assertions above, provides a thorough description of

theory and an assessment of the

own

to

be used against insurgent

forces.

appendices includes the development of a village-based

and resistance movement

program

later

Kennedy, Letter

attempted

to the President,

in

that strikingly resembles the

Vietnam.

It

stresses the importance

22 May 61, POF, Countries, Cuba, JFKL.

30

of the physical separation of the local population from the insurgents
to prevent

the subversion of the former and to remove the base of support from the

latter.

It

also calls for the government, usually the target of an insurgency, to provide

services for

its

inadequate.

It

citizens, especially

clearly

argues

those that the insurgents claim are missing or

that,

without popular support, a government cannot

defeat an insurgency. Essentially, the report describes a strategy by which a

government counters insurgency by winning the hearts and minds
population. Without the

fertile soil

insurgency cannot take

root.

Here

at last

was

authors of the report

provided by dissatisfaction

of the local

among

the people,

the basis for a comprehensive CI doctrine. Whether the

truly

understood how to win hearts and minds

is

not clear,

but the steps they describe are those of almost every successful post war CI
operation. Most importantly, the report emphasizes the importance of

fundamental reform

to

aspect of CI was, as

one wonders,

address the grievances of the insurgents. This

I've

argued, missing from American doctrine.

did this report arrive

channels, almost a year after

its

crucial

Why then,

on the President's desk by such unusual

appearance? The

fact that the report

remained

unpublished as a manual suggests that Pentagon leaders did not yet believe
significant

it

enough

to institutionalize

was authored by members

its

findings.

Its title

and content suggest

its

that

of the special operations community, a group

roundly disdained by the conventional military at the time. Both factors
explain

it

obscurity.

31

may

help

Assuming Kennedy read the

response to quickly transform

belief in flexible

the appearance of

new

1962, which included

embraced

this

CI programs

in

one would expect someone with

report,

contents into doctrine. Given

CI manuals for both the Marine Corps and the

some

study and

Laos

its

will

its

of these lessons,

one gathers

recommendations.

his

My

that

Army

in

Kennedy

analysis of the execution of

demonstrate whether Kennedy understood the idea of a

approach to communist insurgency and how well he digested the

holistic

contents of the

Army

report.

Events of early 1961 must have galvanized Kennedy's belief

posed by a

relentless, global

1961 the Soviets and

advance

their allies

War triumphs

a series of Cold

of

communism.

In

in

March and

the threat

April of

scored what could only have been perceived as

over the Americans.

On March 24 th

,

for

example,

the administration issued a press release claiming that "an unarmed C-47,

assigned to the United States Embassies

down on March 23 over Xieng Khouang
6000

feet... the

47

plane

Washington

fire."

was

rightly

shot

down by

viewed

this

at Vientiane

and Saigon, was shot

province at an altitude of more than
anti-aircraft artillery, not small

development as

critical to

arms

the ongoing CI

Laos. At 6000 feet, the American plane almost certainly had to have

effort in

been shot down by a Soviet Surface

to Air Missile, indicating that,

if

the Soviets

weren't directly involved, they were providing the Pathet Lao insurgents with
relatively hi-tech

April

12

th

manned

,

weapons, and

training

them

Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin

flight into

in their

made

space. This accomplishment

32

use.

Two weeks

the world's

first

amazed and

later,

on

successful

frightened America,

because
space

indicated that the

it

communists were

Who knew what

race.

Then, on

April

shaken by news
staked much

in

of the invasion.

complicated

17

th
,

pulling decisively

upon

Bay

The President had

of Pigs.

terms of personal reputation and national prestige on the success
Its

failure

political

damaged

new

the credibility of the

and diplomatic decision making, as

Presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger,

leaders

to the

the

America and the Kennedy administration were badly

of the disastrous events at the

returning from a

response

in

advantages such technology would give them?

trip to

Cuban

disillusion".

President, had placed great faith

deeply disappointed that

it

sent

Europe, during which he had

catastrophe.

was "shock and

Jr.,

in

The

administration and

well as

accomplishments and advances of global communism seem
relentless.

ahead

all

making the

more

the

Kennedy a

tried to

overriding sentiment

memo

gauge

among European

Europeans, Schlesinger explained to the
the

new American

administration,

had blundered so badly, so early

in its

and was

tenure.

Moreover, he wrote, European leaders were alarmed that "the Kennedy who

launched the invasion was the

real

Kennedy— that talk about 'new methods'

warfare and countering guerrillas represents his
the cold war..."

48

What

the Europeans did not

real

approach

know was

just

to the

how

problems of

right

they

were. Kennedy did intend to approach the problems of the cold war with

methods and by countering
his military planning

guerrillas.

had been woefully

and the President was determined

47

He had made some

Press Release, 24 March 61, NSF, CS:Laos,

33

JFKL

new

naive decisions, and

inept, but his administration

to proceed.

of

was

learning,

I

In

the realm of CI, the failure at the

operations, such as those ongoing

in

Bay

intervention

Among
in

Laos

as

critically

fail

or

initiatives

the initiatives that he quashed
49

in

airlifts

on the back burner

was

The Kremlin must have sensed

Lao and committed

to the Pathet

Cuba, including the

risk of further

be badly compromised.

by an apprehensive or off-balance Washington. After
series of

that covert CI

important to rebuild his administration's

and so put other

credibility with its allies,

temporarily.

it

meant

Laos and Vietnam, ran the

embarrassing the United States, should they

Kennedy, therefore, saw

of Pigs

fateful decision to

direct military

the opportunity presented

April they accelerated

to vast

new

a

military intervention

place nuclear missiles on the island.

50

With events seemingly turning against the U.S., W.W. Rostow advised

Kennedy

that "...the greatest

foreign policy thrown off by

believe

we must resume

we have

we

problem

face

is

not to have the whole of our

what we say and what we do about Cuba

with intensified vigor and perhaps

he counseled, was

to

prove that the U.S. was not "a paper

lines,

short,

what Rostow proposed, and what Kennedy seems

Arthur M. Schlesinger,

Security, JFKL.

50

have taken

tiger."

In

to heart,

diplomacy and non-military intervention techniques. To "redress and

restore" the U.S. position

49

to

Among

greater care and planning to shore up the administration's reputation, and

intensified

48

more boldness than

heretofore envisaged, the lines of action already under way."

those

was

itself...

Emphasis

Schlesinger,

in

Jr.,

is

the international order, Rostow proposed that the

"Reactions to

Cuba

Shlesinger's.

A Thousand Days, 339

Fursenko and

Naftali,

102-103.

34

in

Western Europe", 3 May 61, POF, Cuba

U.S. should publicize the expansionist, absorptive nature of

communism,

advertise their willingness to resort to nuclear blackmail, and offer an American

program of "independence, assistance and partnership" as a
he argued, would show the communists, America's
that the

Cuban mishap was an

Kennedy appears
administration back on

to

its

aberration.

have done

feet,

for counterinsurgency at the Special

expanded the number

just

what Rostow advised. With

Warfare School

year 1962 Defense Budget.

In

reflected

money

at

exercises" of limited war units. Kennedy's

War saw

all

In sealift capability

new budget

the increase

million

and

a jump from nothing to $70

Reston so

emphasis was on

glibly

changes

in

to the fiscal

allocated

in

was $40

million, in

and

$149

million.

the

ammunition,

research and development, Limited

million.

Overall,

same budget saw

and Continental

In

for vast

Kennedy proposed $582.3

Small wonder he created the

pooh-poohed. Reinforcing the perception that

flexibility,

allocations for Strategic

51

his

in

for "readiness, training

million in increases to the limited warfare budget.

that

and he

every sub-category of Limited War, Kennedy's budget called

equipment and stock, $204

stir

at Fort Bragg,

the area of limited war, the Eisenhower

administration had earmarked no

increases.

and

ordered increased training

of Special Forces Groups, adding two overseas

is

his

his attention to the creation

He immediately

Okinawa and Germany. His emphasis

virtually

and the Third World

51

Kennedy returned

training of limited-war-capable units.

allies

contrast. All of this,

Air

his

a $211.5 million decrease

Defense and a $199.3

in

million

W W. Rostow, "The Problem We Face", 21 April 61, NSF, M&M, Policy Planning, JFKL.
35

increase
CI

in

overall

meant newer

Research and Development funds. The

tactics, better

equipment and

training

New

and more

Frontier for the
flexible

responses to communist insurgency. 52

The Special Group For Counterinsurgency
After a year

in office,

with

many

of his CI initiatives underway,

Kennedy

took the unprecedented step of institutionalizing counterinsurgency as a tool of

containment

in

his administration.

National Security Action

On January

Memorandum

#124.

the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)."

In

Its

subject

was "Establishment

an administration known

think-tank, inner-circle style of decision making,

in

Kennedy issued

18, 1962,

for

its

such a group meant that no one

Kennedy's government could look past CI any longer. The Special Group

was

(CI)

chaired Kennedy's Military Representative, General Taylor, and included

Robert

F.

Staff, the

Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, the Chairman
Deputy Secretary of State

of the Joint Chiefs of

for Political Affairs, the

Deputy Secretary of

Defense, the Director of the CIA and the Chief Administrator of the Agency
International

outlined

its

for

Development. The Memorandum that established the Group

primary missions including, "insuring] proper recognition throughout

the U.S. government that subversive insurgency... is a major form of
military conflict

equal

in

importance to conventional warfare."

suggests that Kennedy perceived resistance to

his ideas

administration and wished to re-emphasize his priorities.

52

of

FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume

VIII,

This

politico-

first

among some

mission

in his

The Group's other

p.56-65.

January 62,
Kennedy, "Establishment of Special Group (Counterinsurgency)", 18
NSF, M&M, SGCI, JFKL. Emphasis mine.
53

John

F.

36

responsibilities included assessing CI doctrine

recommendations

for their modification,

and resources and making

development of CI programs

"in

countries and regions specifically assigned to the Special Group (CI) by the
President",

and insuring

that the

emphasis on CI was

organization, training, equipment

and doctrine

reflected in the

of the forces

and agencies

charged with carrying out those CI programs. 54 Attached to the memorandum

was a

list

of the Group's three

Thailand.

It

Kennedy."

55

was sent

It

head

The establishment

by Kennedy because
policy.

to the

it

areas of responsibility, Laos, Vietnam and

initial

of

each agency involved and was signed "Jack

of the Special

Group

(CI)

was an

important step

turned his theories and rhetoric about CI into published

forced recognition of CI's role

in

and provided an interdepartmental body

national strategy

to

upon the

reluctant

synchronize and over watch the

execution of the government's CI policies.

The Special Group
important within the

was,

(CI)

Kennedy

for

obvious reasons, perceived as quite

administration,

unity of effort

and maximum

counterinsurgency. Here also
involve both

economic

civil

and

military

was

was. Here was a

of his senior staff

efficiency

and effectiveness

members
in

spheres, that

now had an

and

it

had

to

military

address

political

ibid.

37

had

it

in

to

and

ones. The doctrine that

infrastructure supporting

54

to

dealing with

institutionalization of the idea that CI

issues, as well as diplomatic

being taught at Fort Bragg

it

some

personal directive from the President to

ensure

and indeed

was

Washington.

The lessons

of the past

workable doctrine and

decade and

developed quite a track record.

its

In

finally

being translated into

inception, the Special

a classified

General Taylor reviewed the group's
list

were

policy.

Scarcely two months after

things he chose to

half

memo

Group had already

dated March 22, 1962,

activities for the President.

were the establishment

of a military

Among

command

Vietnam, the expansion of the Special Warfare Center and School
the elevation of the
it

a prestigious

requirements

latter

school's

commander

job), inclusion of CI training

for flag-rank

training objectives

to Brigadier

and

South

at Fort Bragg,

General

qualification

in

the

among

level

(making

the

promotion across the armed services, codification of

and programs

for the Military

Advisory Assistance Group and

the appointment of a flag officer from each service to serve as a CI
representative on the Joint Staff.
President.
In

All of

these actions had the approval of the

56

June, with the group's purview expanded to include

Cambodia, Congo,

Iran, Bolivia,

new

hot spots

in

Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela,

the President asked Taylor to have the Special Group draw up a

list

of the

greatest insurgency threats facing to United States interests. Out of this grew the

group's

and

first list

There were 13 countries

of hot spots.

non-critical.

Tellingly, only

listed in

Laos and Vietnam made the

two groups,

critical

57

critical

list.

JFKL. The nature of the
Author and Subject Sanitized, 22 March 62, NSF, M&M, SGCI,
memo and the style of writing suggest that its author was probably General Taylor.
56

57

General Maxwell D. Taylor,

1

June 62, NSF, M&M, SGCI, JFKL.
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The Special Group
to

change the mindset

and

most important

of the military.

To be

able to report to the

advantage

sure, there

was now

members

of the laboratory-type

military training for CI,

of the

seems, came

were

colleges. All

also

now

now

Group

were modifications

included instruction

college,

lip

officers

avoid

expertise.

service.

in particular,

have been paid

in

little

CI

It

pre-Kennedy days.

full

situation in

the advances he cited

in

to the staff

and senior service

the principles of CI operations. There

in

MAAG

personnel, as well as increased

is difficult

The curriculum

to

tell

whether many of these

at the service

Even

if

lip

fight

academies and

service and

little

it,

or

if

staff

else might

the lessons being taught to young

more than admonitions
such

officers

to the curriculum at virtually every level

stands out as a place where

killing their livestock,

L.L.

Among

59

to the ideas of CI.

amounted

General
JFKL.

engage

thorough understanding of people's war and how to

efforts reflected a

they were just

many

in trying

that "the military are taking

academies

specialized CI training for

emphasis on language

still

approach afforded by the current

of military education, from the service

58

it

against them. By January 1962, Lemnitzer

Southeast Asia and other areas of the world." 58

was

efforts,

entire units that neither cared for nor ever expected
to

operations. But the tide

was

(Cl)'s

to build schools for the locals

instruction represented a drastic

and

change from

60

Lemnitzer, "Military Training Related to CI Matters", 30 January 62, NSF,

M&M,

Current CI instruction remains rudimentary at the junior-officer level, stressing the
projects. Discussion of
minimization of collateral damage and the development of civic works
Maoist theory. There
fundamental political and economic change remains un-addressed, as does
60

39

In July,

Lemnitzer issued another report entitled "Summary of

Accomplishments Since January 1961." This document boasts

had developed

"a strategy of both therapy

accomplishments on the CI

front

were the

capability

each

in

service.

Most

training of

more than 14000

importantly, however,

greatest gains had been realized

"in

that the services

and prophylaxis". Among the other

from 65 countries and the reorganization of the

officers

Military CI

a peaceful

foreign

military to include CI

he argued that the

area— helping

allied military

forces strengthen the social and economic base of their countries and,

in

so

doing, to create a better image of themselves."61

Lemnitzer's assertions are true, then here, at

If

Philippines

last,

and Malaya properly applied. They would not penetrate

manuals immediately. What appears clear from a review
on CI

is

that the right ideas

the beginning.
thinking

it.

It

and

were

The evidence

that

he wished

there, in the

finally

strategy.

minds

also suggests that

his

government

took a year for him to reverse the

on nuclear

are the lessons of the

to

it

Kennedy's emphasis

few key advisors, from

Kennedy was

privy to their

espouse a doctrine

momentum

By 1962, however,

of a

of

seems

into doctrinal

that included

of fifteen years of

that

Kennedy's

emphasis

priorities

were

being institutionalized throughout his administration. The activities of his

CI operators at Fort Bragg and throughout the Third World were not yet
integrated into doctrine, but a lag
doctrinal

manuals

seems no reason

to

is

between

not unusual. There

is

training,

different in 1962.

40

execution and publication

usually a period during which field

assume and have no evidence
I

fully

to

suggest that the situation was any

in

operators experiment with techniques and procedures that are incorporated into
doctrine only after a review has proven

them

effective,

as seems to have been

the case with Kennedy's CI programs. Reviews of previous CI operations as well
as,

one assumes, reports from

his

program

in

of the decade.

reported

in

new

The

It

emphasis on CI fared

General

July 62,

doctrinal

lag

manuals

trainers, led

for CI in 1963,

does not negate the

July 62 denotes significant progress

from the top down.

61

own operators and

him to push

the direction he did, a direction that led to the publication or

modification of three

end

his

fact that

in

remains to be seen how well
in

L.L. Lemnitzer,

and 7 more before the

what Lemnitzer

the development of CI doctrine
this doctrine

the "laboratory-type" arena of Laos.

"Summary

of Military CI

and Kennedy's

62

Accomplishments Since January 1961," 21

NSF, M&M, JFKL.

FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, FM 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare
Counterinsurgency Forces were all
and Special Operations Forces, and FM 31-22, U.S. Army
doctrine for CI operations. FM 31-16
released (or re-released) in 1962 as implementing
62

Downie 53 shows

that

still

in a CI role, but all of the manuals
suggested that conventional units could be used effectively
the importance of political action in CI.
discussed the need for civil-military cooperation and
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CHAPTER

2

THE POST-WAR QUAGMIRE

LAOS

IN

Introduction

One cannot hope

Kennedy

to understand the

Laos without some background

into the

history of

American intervention

assumed

office,

in

administration's CI efforts

quagmire of Laotian

the kingdom.

Southeast Asia was a region

When

in

and the

politics

President Kennedy

Communist

in turmoil.

guerrillas

backed, America suspected, by the Soviets and Chinese, clashed with

government forces
critical

because

if

in

was considered

both Laos and South Vietnam. Laos

communists succeeded

conquering

in

it

the only thing standing

between them and West-friendly Thailand would be the Mekong

1955 and 1959, Eisenhower had committed hundreds
over $205

million to

ensuring that Laos

outgoing President and his
transition

staff

not the

Between

of military advisors

first

domino

focused on the situation

in

to

fall.

and

The

Laos during the

last

meeting held with the incoming Kennedy administration. He warned

the young President-elect that
bottle",

was

River.

it

was

the key to the region.

Eisenhower's Secretary of State added,

telling

"It [is]

Kennedy,

then Thailand, the Philippines and of course Chiang Kai-shek

Eisenhower and

his advisors

the country. This chapter

will

spoke from

five

years of

the cork

Laos

"If

[will]

go."

often-difficult

examine the development

of

in

the

[falls],

63

experience

American intervention

Kennedy and President
Evelyn Lincoln "Notes of Conversation Between President-Elect
While several versions of what was
Eisenhower" 19 January 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, 24:19.
dictated this one to his assistant, Evelyn Lincoln;
said in this meeting exist, Kennedy personally
places the actual figure for total aid to Laos
Goldstein, American Policy in Laos, 1 38. Goldstein
63

from 1955-59 at $205.4

million,

Prados

at "over

$250

42

million".

in

in

do

Laos
so,

to help set the

must

I

first

and motivations

stage upon which Kennedy's CI operations played

explain the nature of the conflict

Laos, as well as the

To

makeup

of the various factions.

1955, Eisenhower began his third year

In

in

out.

in office

with events

moving quickly and unpredictably. The President maintained

Laos

in

that there

was a

world communist conspiracy, orchestrated by the Soviet Union, and his thinking

made

The Geneva Accords

real.

the

the danger of Laos falling under communist domination

little

of July

1955 seem very

1954 had ended a bloody period

of

civil

war

in

kingdom between the Royal Government, supported by the French, and

the communist Pathet Lao,

once and

for

all.

When

who sought to

oust the French from the Kingdom

negotiations for a cease-fire began, a tiny force of Pathet

Lao, about 1500 combat troops, controlled

Army

in

of 20,000 controlled only the

Mekong

80%

of the country, while the Royal

River Valley.

64

Goldstein suggests

that the ability of such a small force to control such a vast area

Viet Minh's influence.

North Vietnamese

The

aid of the powerful Viet Minh,

Army and

of so few soldiers to hold so

is

evidence of the

who were backed

the Soviet Union, would certainly explain the

much

territory.

In

by the

ability

any case, the Pathet Lao were not

among

permitted to send a delegate to the negotiations that were to decide,

other things, the fate of their country. Nevertheless, the Accords included the

Pathet Lao

in

their

decrees.

The Geneva Accords

set forth a cease-fire date of August 6

Within 120 days after that date,

64

all

th
,

1954.

foreign troops, but specifically, the Viet Minh

Goldstein, 73.

43

and the French, were

to

a small cadre of French

Royal Lao Army, but

was

be out of the country. The tenets of the Accords allowed

government

that

65

Perhaps most

The

latter

provinces of Laos, Phong Saly and
elections anticipated

fatefully,

would include both the

the communist Pathet Lao.

in

the country to train the

assistance by any other external nation or group

military

specifically prohibited

coalition

personnel to remain

military

sometime

were

Sam

1955.

in

the Accords provided for a

existing Royal

to consolidate in

Neua,

to

Government and

two northern

prepare for the national

66

Despite the tenets of the Geneva Accords specifically including the Pathet

Lao

in

the coalition government, Eisenhower

anti-communist.

He was convinced

that the

Vietnam and recognized a communist
of

communism spreading

into

Laos.

north,

was determined

that

Laos must be

Geneva Accords, having
left

the door

open

partitioned

to the possibility

He was, however, hampered

in his

intervene because of the prohibition against foreign military personnel

in

desire to

the

country. But with elections approaching and the Pathet Lao demonstrating

alarming popularity, which might translate
felt

into strength at the polls,

Eisenhower

forced to do something to ensure their defeat. Laos's importance to

America's

vital

national interests

importance of holding the

line

may have been

against

negligible, but the

communism was

symbolic

considerable and

made

intervention almost inevitable.

65

Laos that remained loyal to the King and his
government, that is to say, the national army, changed its name several times. For simplicity's
sake, and to differentiate it from the other factions that did not remain loyal to the King and
government, will refer to the Laotian army as the Royal Lao Army throughout the narrative.

Between 1955 and 1963 the

military forces in

I

66

FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume
Relations, 1952-54, Volume XVI,

XXI, East Asian Security, Cambodia, Laos, 577-578; Foreign
1521, 1540-1543; Goldstein, 66-101.
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From French Colony To Independent Nation

The

story of

American intervention

with the French empire

Laos begins, as

in

does

it

in

Vietnam,

Indochina. Like Vietnam, Laos suffered the

in

ministrations of French colonial rule through

most

of the late nineteenth

and early

twentieth centuries.

In

the

Japan, began a campaign to seize European colonies

latter's

Axis

ally,

1940, as war raged

in

Europe and Paris

fell

to the Nazis,

in

Southeast Asia. Within a year they controlled most of France's former empire
Indochina, including Laos. Japanese
point for Laos

in

throwing

off

while harsh,

rule,

was a

critical

the French yoke. Japanese governors,

turning

in

an

to

purge European influence, encouraged the growth of nationalism

In

Laos, they went so far as to kidnap the son of Laotian King Sissavong

a successful attempt to coerce him

Among
brothers,

all

those

who grasped

intellectuals

initiated

which declared independence

an end

elite.

and

led a

Lao,

67

who

is

at the

composed most

in

67

end

of

World War

II.

This decision

who had launched

a post-war

Indochina and the Royal Government, which

unclear, but their leadership

also

rule.

Vong

Free Lao movement, called Lao

issued a counter-declaration of allegiance to France.

Lao Issara

French

the region.

Princes Phetsarath, Souvanna

put the Lao Issara at loggerheads with the French,
effort to retake their colonies in

to

in

effort

thread of independence were three

this

from the Laotian

Phouma and Souphanouvong
Issara,

into declaring

in

came from

of the Royal

Conboy, Shadow War, 31-35.

45

68

The

ethnic

makeup

of the

the ethnic majority lowland

Government. The Lao Issara were

an example

of a united front insurgent

movement, whose object was

national

independence. The appeals of the Lao Issara and the autonomy granted under

Japanese occupation made reestablishment

of a colonial relationship difficult for

the French. French efforts to gain control of the countryside from Lao Issara
guerrillas

met with

paratroopers to

frustration for nearly a year.

finally

established order

the Lao Issara to flee to Bangkok

in

In

1946 the French sent

Laos, prompting the three princes and

69

France's chance to celebrate the defeat of the Lao Issara
short,

however.

In

and momentum.

Vietnam, communist Viet Minh guerrillas were gaining ground

In

an

effort to free

assets to

fight

the Viet Minh, the French

granted Laos ever-increasing degrees of autonomy.
constitutional

raise

movement was

monarchy.

In

In

1947 they established a

1949, they allowed the Royal Lao Government to

an army. With independence seemingly on the way, Prince Souvanna

Phouma and

his faction of the

Lao Issara had

split

Lao Issara returned, with amnesty,

during their time

in

exile over strategy.

to Laos.

The

Souvanna Phouma

favored gradual evolution to independence, believing the French were destined
to eventually

abandon Laos.

Souphanouvong, the commander

Issara's military forces, favored

military

68

J.

Dommen,

Ibid
70

,

in exile,

disagreeing with

Laos: Keystone of Indochina, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 39

40
69

Lao

an alliance with the powerful Viet Minh and the

overthrow of the French. Phetsarath remained

Arthur

of the

2-3.

Goldstein, 67-70.

46

the introduction of the Viet Minh into the nationalist
Laotian movement. 70

Souphanouvong mounted an

attack against the French

again routed. His tactics further

movement

the Lao Issara,

1949 and declared allegiance

in

thereafter, the

who

to the royal

ejected him from the

government. Shortly

Lao Issara dissolved. 71

Souphanouvong and
where they

split

1947 and was once

in

finally allied

his followers

with

Ho

made

their

way

to North Vietnam,

Chi Minh and the Viet Minh.

Souphanouvong established the Pathet

Lao, a

In

August 1950

movement dedicated

to the

overthrow of the French and the unification of Laos. Later that year, he
established a

Congress

Neo Lao

political

The

of Laos.

latter

loyal to the royal

training

led a nationalist political

first

In

in

northern Laos.

an amazingly
evidence

to

Communist

movement

in

Party.

While

Vientiane that

was

1953 the Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh

of three joint invasions of northern Laos.

the invaders had gained control of

provinces

Resistance

government, the burgeoning Pathet Lao began receiving arms

from the Viet Minh.

launched the

First

organization declared a resistance government, the

Issara, the forerunner of the Laotian

Souvanna Phouma

and

wing of the Pathet Lao, dubbed the

72

As

Sam Neua

that the Viet

and Phong Saly, two

of

1

953

of the

Goldstein points out, the Pathet Lao maintained

effective veil of secrecy

show

By the end

around

their organization.

There

is

Minh heavily influenced the Pathet Lao. The

Pathet Lao carried arms and wore uniforms provided by the Viet Minh. There

47

were Vietnamese advisors with

their units in the field.

Most

tellingly,

the two

forces repeatedly joined forces to attack the French and the Royal
Lao Army.

Aside from

many
were

this cooperation,

very

little is

known about the Pathet Lao and

questions remain. Goldstein asks, for example,
to

communist ideology. Were they

how dedicated

they really

true communists, or only insofar as

earned them the support of the Vietnamese? The Pathet Lao were present
conference sponsored by Vietnam
in

in

the

But

does not prove

this

same meeting

that the Viet

group could have been paying

much needed

gain

Minh

for aid, but

The Pathet

I

support.

Joseph J.
Heath and Co.,

74

service to communist ideology

a

latter

It

an

was

at

latter

effort to

the Viet

group's ideological
front.

an

purity.

They used

coerce the reluctant

set up schools and provided basic government

The Pathet Lao: Organization and Leadership, (Lexington, MA: D.C.

1973.), 45; Goldstein, 67-70, 98-99.

Dommen, Keystone

of Indochina, 40.

13; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 71.

Partners
Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, The North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao:
30-31.
the Struggle for Laos, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 20-22,
75

in

in

to

so the

The Pathet Lao were very dependent on

terror, including assassination, to

They also

Zasloff,

Goldstein, 68;

Conboy,

to aid the Pathet Lao,

Lao's tactics were a mix of people's war and united

into cooperation.

73

were dedicated communists.

do not believe they shared the

propaganda and selective

72

73

that they

Minh agreed
lip

at

1951 at which communist front movements

Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (represented by the Pathet Lao) agreed

alliance.

it

76
Ibid.,

20-22.

48

services

in

some areas

74

to gain support.

Such an unusual mix

of tactics

is

inconsistent with pure Marxism or people's war.

Paul Langer and Joseph Zasloff have argued
did study in

was

France during the height of the popular

front

Souphanouvong

movement there, he

not an ideologically zealous communist. His rhetoric did not reflect Marxist

theory, nor did any of the Pathet Lao's propaganda.

note

while

that,

that,

academic

upon

his return

from France, despite

qualifications, the

It

seems

likely,

therefore, given

historians also

and

his excellent professional

French assigned him

heightening his resentment of French

These two

to

an unimportant post,

75

rule.

Souphanouvong's background and

his

unfavorable experiences with the colonial government, that the Pathet Lao were
less ideologically motivated than they

colonialism.

The economic,

latter assertion.

and have-nots

in

the

and

social

As Langer and

same way

were bent on the eradication

Zasloff
that

political

make

many

of French

natures of the country support the

clear,

Laos

not a land of haves

is

Third World countries are.

It

is

a

country of small villages, largely isolated from one another and the world at large.

The government, any government,
of a villager's

life

and the

wields

little

villager, in return,

influence over the routine events

seems

to

seek

little

government. More importantly, the average Laotian shows
national, let alone global politics.

either by

little

Because so few Laotians are

geography or apathy, the influence of a few

49

from the
interest in

politically active,

elite families

tends to be

exaggerated. Souphanouvong
inequity

was

not an issue

in

came from one

Laos, and there

Pathet Lao's platform, while there

one must conclude

was

that the Pathet

of these families.

was no evidence

anti-French and,

Lao were a united

later,

front

of

76
If

economic

Marxism

in

the

anti-U.S. rhetoric,

independence

movement.
Having

identified the

Pathet Lao as a united

clearly define the nature of their insurgency.

people's war as

seems

to

defined

have been

to colonialism.

little

Mao

But

from and cared

They were not

is

able to

fighting

more

a true

so much as national independence and an end

Langer and Zasloff are

little

one

Neither economic reform, nor land redistribution

it.

their object

if

front,

correct, that

most Laotians sought

about the government, how did a Pathet Lao

independence movement gain support? Their support was based

largely

on the

combination of greater independence granted by Japan and then France,
followed by the shock of return to French

movement

are

first

which makes the

same

period

discernible

latter

saw a

in

argument

rule.

The beginnings

of the

Lao Issara

the period of French reintroduction into Laos,
plausible.

Langer and Zasloff argue that the

rise in the influence of the

Vietnamese

in

Laos. There

is

an

ancient animosity between ethnic Laos and the Vietnamese, and this animosity

helped foment a movement aimed at placing the fate of Laos
Laotians.

The

latter

movement

eventually

50

became

in

the hands of

the Lao Issara, which later

split into

two camps, one that favored the Vietnamese (Souphanouvong's Pathet

Lao) and one that did not.
It

to

is difficult

stirring nationalist

77

conclude confidently that the Pathet Lao succeeded

sentiment

notoriously apathetic Laos.

in

however, that the Pathet Lao were a

Because they were

influence.

structure, although they

Lao were able

among

to gain

relatively small

small, they did not

had one

in

the Viet Minn.

power based on appeals

the politicized elements

in

to

in

One must remember,

movement,

albeit with

a big

need a massive support
It

seems

what

likely that

the Pathet

nationalists there

the country, and maintain

of propaganda, assistance to the populace, selective terror

it

were

with a combination

and copious

aid from

the Vietnamese.

The Royal Lao Government's
the

latter's ability to

protect the

larger

and harder

its

French patrons was hinged on

Kingdom from the communist

which was becoming increasingly

becoming

loyalty to

Viet Minh incursions into

difficult.

to defeat.

insurgents, a task

Laos were

The Pathet Lao, who followed on the

heels of invading Viet Minh forces, gained popular support as the French proved
less

and less able

to protect their provincial subjects.

In

a

final effort to

prevent

the Viet Minh from overwhelming northeastern Laos, the French prepared their
final

in

stand at a strongpoint constructed at Dien Bien Phu, just across the border

North Vietnam.

The

Minh from crossing the

well-armed base was to deter the Viet

intent of this large,

frontier into Laos,

as they had done twice before, and

threatening the old royal capital of Luang Prabang.

Ibid.,

23-29.

51

Dien Bien Phu's
valley.

The French had

to get artillery into the

them

fatal flaw,

dearly.

The

fell

calculated, incorrectly, that the

unqualified

to the

it

to threaten

As have
I

Luang Prabang.

communists on May

Geneva

boon

in

the center of a

enemy would be unable

mountains surrounding the base. This miscalculation cost

after losing their largest base,

Indochina, at

location

its

Viet Minh laid siege to the French strongpoint, while marching

other forces around

Bien Phu

however, was

in

7,

1954.

After nearly four months, Dien

The French could

and they soon negotiated an end

July 1954. But the end of French rule

not last long

to their reign in

was

not such an

for Laos.

implied,

Laos was a nation mostly

name.

in

It

was made up

of

several different ethnic groups, separated generally into mountain tribes and

lowland Lao.

Many

of the former lived

in

small, scattered villages along the

rugged spine of the country and recognized no national boundaries or allegiance
to

any government save

were by

their

far the largest ethnic

own

local elders.

group

in

The lowland Lao,

Laos, at 1.7 million.

or Lao Loum,

They outnumbered

the combined highland tribes, which included the aboriginal Lao Theung, and the

more

recently arrived

Lao

T'ai,

Hmong and Yao

about two to one. There were

also significant Chinese and Vietnamese minorities

in

southern Laos. This mix

defied easy governance and virtually ensured that the minority highlanders,

were by no means

unified in beliefs or allegiances,

government. To make matters worse, the
society, primarily lowlanders,

were

were underrepresented

politicized

segments

who
in

the

of Laotian

often split over the question of the Pathet

Lao's legitimacy and the role of the French

52

in

the royal government.

The

political

disarray contributed to the conditions that allowed
a communist, united front

insurgency to blossom

in

Laos.

Despite the mandate

in

78

the

Geneva Accords

that foreign troops

evacuate

Laos, by the August 5 th cease-fire date, 4,000 Viet Minh guerrillas
remained
Laos. They occupied positions throughout the country, save the
valley.

The Pathet Lao, whom the Geneva Accords had

northern provinces of Phong Saly and

Sam

Mekong

instructed to

in

River

move

to the

Neua, were doing something more

than consolidating and regrouping. They effectively seized control of both
provinces and began governing them, almost as a separate nation, even
providing

Army was

communist

forces,

and with the departure

of

most

of their

French

they were rendered incapable of coercing compliance with the Geneva

agreements from

either the Viet

Two months
cabinet posts

in

after

Minh or the Pathet Lao. 80

Geneva, with many French bureaucrats

in

the

field

French advisors, Laotian King Sissavong Vong

78

Dommen, Keystone of Indochina, 1-7. The
there was no census in Laos until 1985.
Conboy,

13;

still

the Royal Lao Government, and the Lao National

losses to the Viet Minh and Pathet Lao

79

The Royal Lao

disarray after nearly five years of struggle against the guerrilla

in

tactics of the

allies,

basic governmental services to the populace. 79

some

Stevenson, The

Army

suffering

despite the presence of 1500

solicited direct

population figures are

End of Nowhere,

holding

American

Dommen's

estimates;

31.

80

Goldstein, 122-141. Goldstein argues that, short of granting Laos total independence,
thereby removing the Pathet Lao's raison d'etre, there was little either the French or the U.S.

could have done to arrest the influence of the communists

53

in

Laos from 1949-1954.

assistance.

The

old King claimed that without

his national

army would be

bankrupt and incapable of further operations after January 1955. 81

financially

The growth

of the

communist Pathet Lao as a

government and the continued influence
States to

it,

sit

of the Viet

threat to the royal

Minh forced the United

up and take notice of Laos. The U.S. position on Indochina had,

until this point,

been

primarily

one

of sideline support for their French

Eisenhower administration needed French agreement on several issues

Europe aimed

The

ally.

in

spread of communism there. As a consequence,

at preventing the

the Americans were unwilling to alienate the French by implying that the French

could not handle the situation

in

Indochina by themselves. Embroiled

in

a

climate of post-war anti-communism, and firmly believing himself to be facing a
relentless

at

communist

drive for world domination,

Eisenhower saw French defeat

Dien Bien Phu as a sign that the communist insurgency

major regional

threat.

By the eve

of the

in

Laos also posed a

Geneva conference, he began

to

consider an aid program to bolster the Royal Lao Government.
Early United States Intervention

In

response

to the

Royal Lao Government's pleas

for help, the

Eisenhower administration established a diplomatic mission
sent Charles W. Yost to be the

was

to preside over several

first

American ambassador

programs designed

Government by promoting economic,
improvements, as well as

in

to the

to bolster the

public health

Vientiane,

and

Kingdom. Yost

Royal Lao

and educational

indirect military aid, routed through a loophole in the

54

Accords. To assist the Mission with the

December

military

13, 1954, the U.S. established the

aspects of aid to Laos, on

Programs Evaluation

Office

in

the

Mission at Vientiane. 82

Prevented by the Geneva agreements from engaging
intervention

in

Laos, Eisenhower's Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to use "U.S.

civilians with military experience".

Office

was

staffed by a

coincidentally,

often

in

many

Consequently, the Programs Evaluations

group of unusually

of these

well-groomed men. Not

fit,

men had been

discharged from military service,

Special Operations, only days before their assignment to the

The PEO was the consummate

ally with

arms and equipment

therefore, that they

for their

had a demonstrable need

equipment and make sure

it

was

PEO. 83

diplomatic exploitation of a gap

language. Based on a 1950 agreement, the U.S.

French

direct military

in

was allowed

war

in

properly used."

treaty

to supply their

Indochina.

to "receive

in

They reasoned,

and oversee the

The U.S. could

not train the

Royal Lao Army, but the French could, and the Americans could ensure the

French did

it

equipment

to the

correctly.

therefore, really a conduit for funds

Royal Lao Army. The U.S. Mission quickly found

virtually the entire

81

The PEO was,

operating budget of the Lao National

Army and

itself

and

funding

providing

Charles W. Yost, Telegram to State Department, date unknown, NSF, Countries, Laos,

JFKL
Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U. S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao
Government, 1955-1975, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 14-17.
82

83

FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume

XXI, East Asian Security, Cambodia, Laos, 585; Stevenson, 39.
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significant quantities of military

hardware besides. The non-military aspects of

the Mission continued, but were vastly overshadowed
by the military spending.

Among
highway
for the

a

the non-military programs the U.S. Mission initiated were: a

building

program

to improve road

Mekong River to provide a

rural health

particularly

84

vital

access

to the interior, a ferry

program

trading link with neighboring Thailand,

and

care program dubbed Booster Shot. 85 These operations,

Booster Shot, were designed

part to aid the Royal

in

Government

in

the elections of 1958 by showing that they could care for their citizens. They

were,

in short,

attempts to eliminate the problems that the communist Pathet Lao

insurgents exploited to gain local support. Eisenhower

the nuances of CI, but there were those

CIA,

who

in

may

not have understood

his administration, especially in the

did.

Together the non-military programs totaled roughly $5

million

and

did not

prevent the communists from carrying the elections. The aid programs were
with corruption and
rural

in

much

of the

money and equipment

improvement programs found

their

way

into the

rife

sent for construction and

pockets of Laotian

officials

charge of their management.
In contrast,

American

military aid to

Laos from 1955-59 amounted

to

roughly $40 million per year, plus nearly $4 million between 1958-59 for a military

pay

raise for the Royal

Lao Army. The $40

million

was

intended to stimulate the

Laotian economy, but apparently far exceeded the economy's

Castle, 14-17; Goldstein, 166.

Goldstein,

ibid.

56

ability to

absorb

capital.

Goldstein argues that this fact

million surplus

is

by the Royal Government

affirmed by the accumulation of a
in

$40

these years, the equivalent of an

entire year's aid. 86

With an army bolstered by U.S. aid providing a degree of
integration of Pathet

held the

when

Geneva-mandated

those elected

the Pathet Lao.

and the

Lao forces seemingly underway, the Royal Lao Government

the Pathet Lao legally

Among

stability,

free elections

won

in

1958. They were surprised

nine of the ten seats

was Souphanouvong,

The Pathet

May

it

contested

in

the election.

the once-exiled Prince and leader of

Lao-allied Santiphab party carried four more, giving

the communists control over 13 of 21 available seats and drastically altering the

balance of power

in

Vientiane.

87

This turn of events perplexed and alarmed the

Eisenhower administration, but apparently not many of the Laotians.
opinion of

Ambassador Yost, the

true communists, but rather

fold

once reasonable give and take

There

is little

"wayward brothers who
[is]

will

return patriotically to

presented," and so negotiations to

communists with the

evidence

the

Laotian government did not consider the Pathet

Lao

integrate the newly elected

In

existing royalists continued.

88

to explain the Pathet Lao's electoral victory in

1958. Their military power derived from Viet Minh support, but the source of their
political

power

is

harder to pinpoint.

It

seems

likely,

however, that

their

popular

support derived from the strength of their united front tactics against the French.

Goldstein, 179-203.
Zasloff, 46.

FRUS, 1955-1957, East Asian

Security, 640-641.
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Simply stated,

their electoral victories

suggest that

politically

aware Laotians

supported their drive to oust the French and unify the country.

Many

of these

Laotians must have agreed with Souphanouvong's assessment
of the royal

government as a puppet

of the French. This

assessment appears accurate,

based on Souvanna Phouma's appointment as Prime Minister
1951

.

in

November

Souvanna's appointment must have struck some Laotians as both

suspicious and galling, given his easy acquiescence to the reintroduction of

French authority and the dissolution of the Lao Issara without independence
having been achieved.
In

reaction to the newly legitimized

Government, a group of

Defense of National
party

won

right

wing

Interests.

As

communist influence

politicians

in

the Royal Lao

formed the Committee

the radical anti-communist voice

for the

in

Laos, this

U.S. support, prompting neutralist Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone,

appointed after Geneva, to embrace a "more pro-Western brand of

neutrality."

Part of the 1954 agreement that had formed the coalition government

the provision that the
the Royal Lao

st

1

Army and

and 2

nd

Pathet Lao Battalions would be integrated

stationed

in their

home

territory

clear

in

the Spring and

Phoui's government

Summer

was pursuing a

of

firmly

Conboy, 18-19.

58

1959

was

into

on the Plain of Jars,

where they had already established strong defenses and a base

became

89

that the right

of support.

As

wing of the

anti-communist policy and would not

it

allow the Pathet Lao to

assume

their duly-elected place in the coalition

government, these two battalions balked

The downward

spiral of

Government, angered by

this

at integration.

events accelerated when the Royal Lao

perceived waffling on the part of the Pathet Lao,

had the Royal Army surround the soldiers on the

position

Lao under the best

fight,

the

st

1

of circumstances, but they had a superior

Battalion capitulated.

surprise.

The 2 nd

Facing long odds

Battalion seized the

opportunity provided by a rainy night and fled the Plain for North Vietnam on

18

th
.

After a brief pursuit

border.

Upon hearing

of

the news, Phoui had

an

May

and skirmish, the communists escaped across the

cohorts placed under house arrest.

The escape

to

Army posed a moderate

and had caught the Pathet Lao somewhat by

and a tough

and issue an ultimatum

Plain

the recalcitrant communists. At this point, the Royal
threat to the Pathet

90

Souphanouvong and

his

communist

91

entire battalion of

communist

fighters into North

Vietnam, as well as the subsequent desertion of hundreds more

who had

already

integrated into the Royal Lao Army, prompted the Eisenhower administration to

escalate

PEO

had

its

involvement

restricted

officers staffing the

its

in

Laotian

affairs.

role to training

PEO

until

Until this point,

it

appears that the

and advising. There were only

six field

January 1959, when newly-appointed Programs

Major General Oudone Sananikone, The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and
document
Support, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981), 49-50. This
was written by a Laotian general who was Deputy Defense Minister under Phoumi, among other
was therefore in a
posts. He attended U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and
90

unique position to deal with the American
aid

programs

in

military

advisors and diplomats

Laos.

59

who

administered U.S.

Evaluations Office director John Heintges,
a

discharged from service to take the post

manpower. The organization
World War

II

in

in

Laos grew

veterans of Heintges' unit

in

rising

Army

Brigadier General

Laos, requested a drastic increase
to include

the 3

65 administrators,

in

(all

rd

Infantry Division,

which had

fought across France and Germany), and 12 teams
of eight special operations
soldiers each, deployed to

Laos on

forces, nominally under the

six

month

command and

tours.

These

control of the

special operations

PEO, were

part of

an

operation called Hotfoot. Collectively dubbed the Lao Training
Advisory Group

(LTAG), the soldiers of Hotfoot were

Simons, a veteran of Ranger and

led

OSS

by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur

units in

World

pioneers of American Special Operations. 92 The

French

LTAGs

II

and one of the

set up

shop

training sites throughout the country and, alongside their

counterparts,

manner

of

began

training

Royal Lao Army units

weapons, from small arms

to rocket

Hotfoot sputtered to a halt as quickly as

Army

War

lost four

outposts

in

the province of

Sam

in

"Bull"

at four

French

the use and care of

launchers and mortars.
it

started

when

all

93

the Royal Lao

Neua. The Royal Army reacted

by mounting an aggressive campaign against the 2 nd Pathet Lao Battalion (the

one

that

had escaped the Plain of Jars the previous May), but without much

success. U.S. intervention

in

the

Sam Neua

incident

supplies, although the Eisenhower administration did

was

limited to

move

According to Hamilton-Merritt, Colonel Simons would lead the U.S.
prison in North Vietnam in 1970.

60

Joint

raid

airlift

of

Task Force 116,

on the Son Tay

composed

of Marines, airpower

position

the South China Sea, should the communists

push

in

into

Laos.

Hotfoot found

As

and special operations forces

program

Royal Government
it

was

a determined
it

died down, and

life.

military assistance

time,

a staging

94

new

and 107 Special Forces

civilians

make

quickly as the fighting had flared, however,

By the end of 1959, the Programs Evaluations
175

into

in

in

trainers

95

come

communists doing the

not the

had grown

to

over

and constituted the largest U.S.

Southeast Asia.

Vientiane began to

Office

Despite

this, in

December, the

apart at the seams, although this

tearing.

Royalist Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone, long at odds with the right wing

Committee

for the

Defense of National

Interests,

extended the term of the

National Assembly, his last bastion of power, through the scheduled elections of
April 1960.

This action, he hoped, would prevent the elections and his inevitable

defeat at the

polls.

96

With the time thus bought, he hoped to

blow against the communists and thereby regain some of
support. Luck

In

was

strike

a decisive

his constituents'

not with him, however.

response to Phoui's

action, the

Committee, led by Colonel Phoumi

Nosovan, the Deputy Minister of National Security and Army Chief of

Staff,

Conboy, 20-21; Stevenson, 29; Richard H. Schultz, Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi:
Vietnam, (New
Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North
93

York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), 266.
94

Conboy, 21-25.

95
Ibid.,

25.

96

Ibid
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staged a coup, with the backing of the CIA

Phoumi surrounded the Prime

A

resignation.

deployed

young

rising

in

Minister's residence

star in the Royal

97

Vientiane.

Military forces loyal to

and demanded

his

Lao Army, Captain Kong

his paratroopers to maintain order throughout Vientiane.

morning, the coup ended successfully, and bloodlessly,

when

Le,

The next

the King received

Phoui's resignation.

The Eisenhower

administration

split

over

whom

to support

struggle between semi-neutralist Phoui Sananikone and rightist

Nosavan. Many

would

taint

in

in

the power

Phoumi

the State Department worried that Phoumi's militant image

the government and drive people to the Pathet Lao camp.

The

Phoumists were supported by the assessment of the U.S. Ambassador

who

did not consider

won America's

Phoumi a

all

of

whom

who

Washington

1959 and that Eisenhower was unsure

chance

to

Phoui eventually

favored Phoui Sananikone.

confusion over
in

to Laos,

support, albeit hardly enthusiastic, with the help of pressure from

France and Australia,

Britain,

particularly skilled politician.

anti-

to support

suggests that events

keep the communists out

ousted and Phoumi

came

to

of the

in

98

Laos were not clear
of

government.

who
In

any case, Phoui was
after the coup.

Following the coup, the King installed an interim Prime Minister,
to Minister of

and the CIA had helped put them

97

Sananikone, 47-^9; Stevenson, 88.

98

Stevenson, 87-89.

there.

Defense. The CDNI was

But with four months

62

to

provided the best

dominate the government set up

Abhay, and promoted Phoumi

The

until

Kou

in

power,

the next

elections, Heintges

he stayed
setting

there.

and the Eisenhower administration were eager

The PEO and

up medical

clinics in

hamlets throughout Laos

in

U.S.

Embassy

staff set to

the backcountry and

air

work

at

to

ensure that

a fever

pitch,

dropping supplies to isolated

the hope of galvanizing support for the new, pro-

western government."

The

elections held

on

April 24,

1960 were a sham.

Ballot

box

stuffing

and

fraudulent counting, also apparently orchestrated by the CIA, ensured a victory
for the right

wing Committee for the Defense of National

also a victory for the U.S.

100

The Pathet Lao was

Interests,

which was

out of government and the

newly elected Royal Lao Government was (again) pro-west. The Royal Lao

Army was making
to

see the

24

th

at

strides toward

fruits of its

counterinsurgency

Souphanouvong and the

,

Camp Phonekheng, were

The stage was thus

becoming a viable
efforts.

rest of the Pathet

fighting force

and beginning

Then, on the morning of

Lao leadership,

still

May

imprisoned

allowed to escape by complicit prison guards.

set for a

communist resurgence and the onset

101

of a crisis

in

Laos.

Kong

The next
Committee

crisis in

for the

Vientiane would

Defense

commander Kong Le found

99

Le's

come from

within.

Following the

of National Interest's successful coup, paratrooper

himself and his

Sananikone, 52-60.

100

Coup

Sananikone, 58; Stevenson, 88.
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men

constantly deployed on one wild

goose chase
quartered

in

When

after another.

they weren't deployed, the

ramshackle huts on the

mud

flats

elite unit

outside of Vientiane.

was

Kong Le

protested both the misuse and mistreatment of his soldiers, but he found
the

Royal Lao Army general
hopelessly corrupt.

The son

staff

unsympathetic to

his soldier's

102

Lao Theung peasants, Kong Le had

of aboriginal

Royal Lao Army at the age of 17. He had exhibited enough

appointment to the French-run
without

much

distinction.

officer

the Army's paratroop unit as

paratroopers

was

during the

its

in

skill

enlisted

to

in

the

be granted an

candidate school, from which he graduated

He remained

Geneva Accords and

following the

needs and almost

in

the

Army

after

was reduced

it

1958, he volunteered and

executive

Sam Neua

officer.

fracas,

His

first

in

size

was accepted

for

action with the

when they were deployed

to fight

the Pathet Lao, a mission he considered unwarranted based on the insurgents'
habit of going to ground
well as acting

enjoyed the

commander

the face of superior forces.

stealing

most

Kong Le came

American

aid

meant

to

government

that

acquitted himself

CDNI's coup, and

elite soldiers in his nation's

to believe that the

arm and

train

paratroopers. Exasperated by this corruption, he
coalition

He had

of the paratroopers during the

loyalty of the toughest,

After the coup,

were

in

army.

103

Royal Lao Army generals

Laotian forces, including his

came

to

see a

neutralist,

would include the Pathet Lao and be unfettered by the

Sananikone, 60. General Sananikone believes it was Phoumi himself who allowed
Souphanouvong to escape. In a twist indicative of the bizarre state of Laotian politics, the two
were brothers as well as rivals, and Phoumi, he claims, was "erratic and impulsive."
101

102

Ibid

,

103
Ibid.,

61.

31-46.
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corrupting influences of either Soviet or American aid,
as the only viable
alternative

months

and he began developing a plan

of incessant operations

including

in

one mistaken incursion

which

into

plan.

He found

nearly

make

his soldiers

Cambodia

help were ignored, Kong Le assembled his

the government.

to

were

routinely misused,

during which the unit's calls for

men and

outlined his plans to seize

unanimous support among

his

men

for his

104

At 0300 on August 9 th Kong Le's battalion
,

the Royal Lao Army's headquarters
the

his idea a reality. After

city,

in

initiated its

coup. They seized

Vientiane, blocked the main road through

secured the central bank, radio station and telephone exchange and

arrested the

commander

of the Royal

forces achieved control of the

Lao Army

city in less

in his

bedroom.

105

Kong

Le's

than four hours with only six casualties.
i

But the

difficulties

Kong Le

were

just beginning for him, his country

installed Prince

Souvanna Phouma, a

and the United

States.

left-leaning neutralist,

as
I

Prime Minister and

initiated

cooperation with the Pathet Lao. Both

alarmed American policy makers and pro-west Laotian leaders
response, General Phoumi Nosovan,

late of the

moves

alike.

In

Royal Lao Army, began a
i

I

counter-coup against Kong Le and Souvanna

Phouma

that resulted in a series of

bloody skirmishes and ended with the Battle of Vientiane

Phoumi

prevailed

in

his counter-coup,

in

December 1960.

and forced Kong Le and the Pathet Lao

104

Warner, Shooting at the Moon, 29. Four of Kong Le's officers chose not to participate
the Coup, but apparently maintained enough personal loyalty to keep it a secret.
Thailand:
Chalermnit Press Correspondent, The Battle of Vientiane 1960, (Bangkok,
Chalermnit Press, 1961 ), 42-56.
105

65

in

to

flee north, while

Souvanna Phouma and most

posts, and their country, for safe haven

Shortly after they fled the
for

and received the

Soviets, by

way

government

Buon

Oum

provisional

of

first

government consisted
cabinet posts

Kennedy was sworn

In

messy

Laos,

of the military

among

equipment from the

of military

Boun

was

and Boun

and

107

It

Boun Oum,

in

easy answers but demanded

and the Royal Lao Government were

loyal to

Oum

loyal supporters.

shortly after his counterpart,

Oum

installed Prince

his Deputy. This

Kennedy Found

Situation as

in

his family

situation that defied

the royal government.
peasantry.

airlifts

primarily of lowland Lao,

wobbly, with Souvanna's government

Most

Le's forces and the Pathet Lao asked

as Prime Minister and Phoumi Nosovan as

inherited a

their

106

Souvanna Phouma and, on December 14 th 1960,

The

attention.

Cambodia.

in

Kong

of a series of

government abandoned

of Hanoi. Meanwhile, the King dismissed the absent

liberally distributed

He

city,

of his

Laos.

his

upright, but

exile refuting their claims to legitimacy.

in

Deputy Prime Minister Phoumi, and therefore

The same was not necessarily

The Royal Government was

true of the Laotian

largely nepotistic

and represented few

the nation's ethnic groups save lowland Lao. Adding to the mix, Souvanna

Phouma

still

claimed to be the

been dismissed by the

Dean Rusk,

107

Sananikone, 71-74.

Prime Minister of Laos, despite having

King. Meanwhile, on the Plain of Jars,

Phouma's former Information

106

rightful

Minister claimed that he

"Information Paper: Laos", 27

March

66

61,

to

was

Souvanna

the only legitimate

NSF, Countries, Laos, JFKL.

of

representative of the neutralist government, having remained with

during the Battle of Vientiane, and following the

evacuation of the

latter's

Buon Oum's government was unpopular and

Internally,

harassment from Kong Le and the Pathet Lao. Outside

Oum government was
continued

its

much

hard pressed to wield

operation, although the fighting

program. The infrastructure

built

real

all.

The PEO

intact.

Lao Government enjoyed

communists.

at

Boun

Vientiane interrupted their

little

besides the United States, which was primarily interested
alternative to the

suffered regular

of Vientiane the

power

capital.

up since 1955 and emanating from the U.S.

Mission at Vientiane remained mostly
Externally, the Royal

in

Kong Le

In contrast,

support from anyone

in

them as an

Kong Le and the Pathet Lao were

backed strongly by the North Vietnamese, and the communist world almost
unanimously supported Souvanna Phouma's claim

Kennedy

did not

assessed the Boun
"The Boun

and tends
that their

Oum

Oum

government as unpredictable and

government

assessment was

Plain of Jars

and

Oum was
and the

in

vital

politically

Prime Ministership.

particularly reliable ally in Vientiane.

is

not particularly

to act without consultation."

Boun

militarily

have a

to the

all

a

108

amenable

He would

His staff

unreliable, saying,

to United States advice

find out in

February 1961,

too accurate.

difficult position.

The

insurgent Pathet Lao held the

road networks that criss-crossed

it.

They also had the

powerful Viet Minh supporting them. They continued to

strengthening their hold on
receive supplies from the Soviet Union as well, vastly

108

Rusk, "Information Paper: Laos", JFKL.
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northern Laos.
external aid
for

its

other

it

The Royal Government,

received

came from

Thus

liabilities.

stuck,

for

its

part,

the U.S.,

in

quantities that did not

Buon

Oum

the U.S. hoped for

in

The problem

was

that they

meant

apparently

needed

to

felt

that

compensate

The

declaration

was

not what

Laos, but the Kennedy administration publicly supported

for the

Royal Lao Government

would be forced

it

offered a

left

it.

to reach a settlement

non-communist

on the sidelines

to stand

such a predicament

in trying

weakness. The problem

position of

that Laotian neutrality, while

that the U.S.

and the only

began seeking a negotiated

his supporters.

were negotiating from a

Kennedy was

allies

and the King issued a declaration

of Laotian neutrality on February 19, 1961 and

peace with Souvanna Phouma and

had few

in

for

alternative,

Laos.

Kennedy

him open to Republican attacks. He

appear tough on communism, especially early

in

his tenure,

and

accepting neutrality might be perceived as allowing a loophole that the

communists could

slip

through. Kennedy's margin notes on the above

information paper indicate the sensitivity of the matter
effort to

express support

who opposed

neutrality

for

politically.

Laos without alienating Republicans

as the

first

step towards

communism, he

In

an apparent

in

Congress,

substituted the

phrase "The U.S. favors a neutral Laos, independent and not aligned with either
political bloc" to

the earlier "The U.S. does not oppose a neutral policy for Laos,

so long as the Lao government desires

it

and

it

can

in fact

be maintained."

109

In

the climate of the Cold War, Kennedy couched his language on Laos carefully,

so that

it

would be

Democrats

in

difficult for his

opponents

to find fodder to

the mid-term elections and again

68

in

1964.

use against

American money and personnel had been
inception of the

PEO

program

of the neutralists, then

By 1960,

with

Kong

the country, the

PEO

Laos since the

in

waned

with the Pathet

in

for

failure in foreign policy.

therefore

All

amount

of the

American

to nothing

the international community,

if

aid

and

in

the country

and

in

in

northern Laos.

that case,

communist

many

Kennedy's

was

of

virtually

years would

The perception on the

would have been one of
In

part of

victory for the

the months after the Bay of

would weigh heavily on Kennedy.

importantly, previous aid aside,

the entire region might too.

not be allowed to happen.

that the

the Soviets were allowed to continue openly

Pigs, especially, this possibility

told,

intents

training of the previous six

communists. U.S. prestige would have suffered.

was

all

embarrassment on two

and domestic. There was no guarantee

supplying pro-communist forces

More

Neua.

110

potential political

advisors believed that the military situation
111

Sam

in

Laos. National prestige was, as always, closely linked

insurgents would negotiate with the Royal Government and

untenable.

1959, with the rise

in

Lao attacks

and the CIA were waging what was,

Laos presented Kennedy with
fronts, international

up

Le's neutralist coup demonstrating the continued instability of

apparent success or

its

1955. Support had

in

waxed again as

purposes, a covert war
to

tied

In

if

Laos were allowed

to

fall,

Kennedy

the climate of the Cold War, that could

Kennedy had run on a

platform

critical

of

109

ibid.

110

Prados, 262-263

January 61 assesses
from the Embassy in Laos to the State Department, 18
best protracted struggle...", NSF, CS: Laos, JFKL
the situation as follows: "military prospect is as
111

A telegram

69

Eisenhower's containment strategy. He had been elected with a minority
of the
popular vote and knew

that,

unless he appeared to maintain a hard

communism, he would open himself up

to

line

against

Republican attack. Moreover, he

believed the American people would not tolerate another war on the scale of

Korea. Their stomach for casualties
identifying had,

in

a war with which they had trouble

he believed, doomed Truman, and he would not tempt the same

fate.

With covert operations

still

underway

in

Kennedy had three

Laos,

choices:

escalation to conventional war, escalation of counterinsurgency operations and a

covert war, or an

abandonment

diplomatic

The new President chose

effort.

already ankle deep

The

in

of military operations

and an increased

the middle path, and the U.S.,

the murky waters of Laos, sank

in to its

knees.

112

overriding consideration of the Eisenhower administration's policies

Laos had been

hard-line containment of

administration, led by a pragmatic

communism. The Kennedy

young

politician with

an

affinity for

operations and counterinsurgency promised to offer something

Apparent acceptance

of neutrality

had

in

to

be followed by

covert

different.

tangible,

demonstrable

action to ensure the American people believed that the President had not

surrendered Laos to the communists. Failure

to

do

that,

he knew, would

spell

political disaster.

112

Lawrence

J.

Politics of War", in

and the
Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam
Kennedy's Quest for Victory, Thomas G. Paterson, ed., (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1989

),

229.
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For the Pathet Lao, the transition from French colonial rule to American
aid

must have seemed quick and complete. Indeed, the communists appear

have

shifted easily from resisting

what seemed

one

to the nationalist Pathet

to replace the departed

to resisting the other.

Lao

to

The

71

installation of

be an American puppet government

French puppet government ensured that

would continue.

to

their

insurgency

CHAPTER

3

KENNEDY'S COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

IN

LAOS

Introduction

John
he took

F.

office.

Kennedy was

getting advice

on the

situation in

Laos even before

His incoming administration, particularly his inner

his predilection for covert operations

and

his belief in CI

as a

circle,

tool of

knew

of

containment.

Moreover, the outgoing Eisenhower administration had stressed the importance
of

Laos and the tenuous nature

of

its

government's hold on

telegram from the American Embassy

in

power.

political

Vientiane to the Department of State

outlined the situation succinctly for Kennedy, saying: "military prospect

protracted struggle which holds out
in

near

effort...

I

believe

it

in

is

on

and

political,

it

an

illusion to

hope

that the

did at the very beginning of

must have confirmed two things
flexible

US

integrity of

needed

to

and status

at best

country

economic and

alone supporting the Lao

in

first

diplomatic

crisis, this

the President's mind. First

Before he could act decisively

be brought up
of ongoing

to

US

speed on the

intervention.

American Embassy in Vientiane
1961, NSF, CS: Laos, JFKL

in

situation

His

first

essential."

113

assessment

was

for

in

the need a

a CI campaign

Laos, however,

in

Kennedy

the country and the nature

month

to the Secretary of State,

72

is

Kennedy's presidency, and from

response capability generally, second was the need

specifically.

is

terms of countering the [Pathet Lao] anti-[government]

the country that presented him with his

113

for security

forces... can establish security in Laos... a political solution

Coming as

Laos

hope

future... this effort requires material help

psychological side

armed

little

A

in office

was, therefore,

Telegram 1364, 18 January

characterized by a thorough policy review. While he had
the luxury of a relative
lull

the cycle of coup and counter-coup

in

1960 and February 1961,
easy

task.

that,

even as he was

Laos between the end of December

getting a clear picture of

Intelligence gathering

what was going on was no

was made even more complicated by

trying to discern the situation

response, there were ongoing

ever-changing

in

US

operations

in

the fact

and formulate a workable

Laos that often impacted the

political picture.

Kennedy's Beliefs Confirmed
With two Prime Ministers claiming legitimacy, Kong Le cooperating with
the Pathet Lao and the Soviets supplying the communist insurgents, the situation

Kennedy faced

weeks

in

Laos was anything but

of his presidency

potential

was

that

clear.

What was

Laos was quickly turning

superpower showdown. The President believed

convince the Soviets that he was
political solution to

the dilemma.

clear

willing to fight

The

solution

the early

in

into the

that

scene

he needed

of a

to

over Laos, while pursuing a

he sought appears

included the possibility of a truly neutral government

in

to

have

Vientiane, rather than the

staunchly anticommunist government insisted on by Eisenhower. Such a policy

was

a major

shift for

US

diplomacy

To ensure the establishment
have

to

mount a

in

of a neutral government,

detailed, effective CI

by the Pathet Lao

to build

Southeast Asia.

program

that

Kennedy would

would eliminate the

popular support. With American CI doctrine

fuel

used

still

strongly reflecting the experiences of Korea and the opinions of a conventionally

minded Pentagon, the President faced an

73

uphill battle.

He had

to

impose

his

limited

war program on the

military before

Fortunately for the President, the

tended
light

to

CIA and

a far cry from the

holistic

their counterparts in the

CI doctrine, even as

military

it

personnel operating

of their strategies

and

in

Laos

terms of

in

remained

tactics

Pentagon. Laos, therefore, promised to

served as a laboratory

the decision making mix.

memorandum

many

Laos.

in

approach favored by Kennedy, they were closer than

Kennedy would soon

find that

in

domestic

On January

which to develop the new.

political

21, 1961,

test the existing

pressure

was

also part of

Kennedy received a lengthy

from Senator Mike Mansfield regarding the "Laotian Situation".

The Senator had been contacted

directly

about the course of events

Phouma's

could be put into action

be experienced special operators, who thought about CI

forces and small units. While

bitterly

it

in

by Souvanna Phouma,

Laos and the status of U.S.

who complained
intervention.

chief complaints, which Mansfield apparently agreed with,

tendency of the U.S.

to

back prominent Laotians while ignoring the less

prominent, the exaggeration of the threat of
insisted that there

were

were the

communism

in

the country

"less than 100" Laotian communists),

perceived as the blocking of neutrality. The Senator added to

(Phouma

and what he
this

list

indictment that aid to Laos would have a "corrupting and disrupting

his

own

effect... on

an

unsophisticated nation such as Laos." Mansfield followed up his complaint with a

list

of

recommendations aimed

argued,

was

to create

at creating

a neutral Laos. The

way

a neutralization commission composed of

and Afghanistan. The key

to

it

all,

however, was a cutback

74

in

to

India,

do

that,

he

Pakistan

U.S. military

intervention, either by reintroducing the French as
trainers, or by introducing a

new, Asian-based

training

a follow up

In

memo,

action would accomplish a
neutralization

was

team created

Mansfield expressed his belief that such a course of

number

of important diplomatic goals.

commission would put Asians

"essentially

purpose

for the

in

an Asian problem." Second,

from charges of "imperial meddling"

in

a

charge of what Mansfield judged

would make the U.S. immune

it

Laotian

First,

and would force the

affairs,

Soviets and Chinese to abstain from intervention as well, or face such charges.
Finally,

it

would allow the U.S. to extricate

commitment..."
It

is

itself

"from an untenable over-

114

a small wonder, given the assessment of the embassy

and pressure from

within his

own government,

escalation to conventional military force

that

Laos.

in

in

Vientiane

Kennedy decided against

He must have been more

convinced than ever that a dedicated, broad-spectrum CI campaign was required
to

address the thorny problems of Laos.

Ongoing Operations
There were
took over. The
provided

PEO's

Army

114

airlift

at least three

first,

in

Laos

operations underway

and perhaps best known, was an

of supplies

tenure, the CIA's

units

in

and personnel

to the

in

Laos when Kennedy

Air

America operation

Royal Army. Throughout the

de facto aviation wing had conducted

Laos, usually from bases

in

that

airlifts

to

Royal

Thailand. During Phoumi's counter-

Subjects, Laos,
Senator Mike Mansfield, "The Laotian Situation", 21 January 1961, POF,

JFKL
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coup

in

December 1960, these

successfully drive

Kong

airlifts

had proven

critical to

the Army's

ability to

Le's forces from Vientiane.

The second operation

that

Kennedy

inherited

was

the Royal

Army

training

conducted by the U.S. Army Special Forces and supervised by the PEO.
While
still

nominally a

civilian operation,

Army

training the Royal

Sananikone

to

power

since the

in

the

PEO

rightist

early 1959.

First

had taken an increasing

coup

that

dubbed

role in

had brought Phoui

Hotfoot, this mission

would

change names and expand under Kennedy's watch.

The

ongoing operation was, as

third

mission based

in

patrol the border

far

as can be determined, a CIA

Thailand and focused on training small units of special police to

and defend against Chinese insurgent

activity.

These

special

Thai units were called Police Aerial Reinforcement Units (PARU), and their
training included a graduation exercise that parachuted

contested areas.

115

Le's

coup

in

1960,

they recaptured the

None
Malaya. To

None

stressed

PARU

units

in

had accompanied Phoumi's forces when

were CI operations

in

the mold of the British operation

civil-military

cooperation.

All

were expressly intended, as

limited warfare, with fighting the

addressing the

economic or

Castle, At

in

none addressed the basic problems exploited by the Pathet Lao.

Eisenhower's beliefs on

115

Thailand. Following

city.

of these

wit,

into insurgent-

Since 1957, small groups of Lao soldiers, mostly from the

paratroop battalions, had also trained with these units

Kong

them

political,

War in

the

Shadow

befitted

enemy, rather than

social questions plaguing the country.

of Vietnam, 38.
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Given Kennedy's
reflect

a more

beliefs

about

approach.

flexible

one would expect subsequent operations

CI,

It

remains to be seen how well

his beliefs

to

were

translated into action.

Evolving Intervention
In

program
program,

the waning days of his presidency, Eisenhower had approved a

arm and

to

initially

Hmong, a mountain

train the

called Operation

tribe of northern

Momentum, was

in its

Laos. That

opening stages

in

January 1961, but quickly became one of the centerpieces of American
intervention. With the Royal

Government

controlling

Vientiane and the Pathet Lao/Kong Le forces

still

little

of the territory north of

a threat,

Kennedy expanded

the operation.

CIA operative
father of the

with

Vang

PARU

Bill Lair,

program

Po, a prominent

a longtime veteran of Southeast Asia, and the

in

Thailand,

Hmong

moved

leader.

into

Laos

in

January and met

Vang Po had fought

the Vietnamese
i

and the Pathet Lao
training offered

by

for

years and was anxious to obtain the new arms and
116

Lair.

The Hmong,

also

commonly known as

had practiced subsistence farming

They roamed
allegiance.

freely

in

the Meo, were an ancient tribe that

the Laotian highlands for generations.

across national borders and recognized no particular national

From the

earliest

days of French colonization, the Hmong had grown

opium poppies, which both the French and the resistance had used
operations

116

Parker,

in

the region.

Codename

In

Mule,

the 1950s the

xi-xii.

77

to fund

Hmong, under Touby Lyfoung,

the

first

of their tribe to graduate from a university,
had sided primarily with the French.

Under Touby's leadership,

in fact,

the

Hmong had

attempted an overland

the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien
Phu.

and another turn

Hmong's

of side taking loomed,

military leader to

Vang Po's

military

he was a messenger
as a

member of a

Vang

Touby

As French

partisan

Po, a long-term veteran of the Royal Lao Army.

French army. He had engaged

Hmong

force

out his class and ran the

Minh's war into Laos.

He found and

II,

in guerrilla

guerrilla force that

killed

every

to

do so

academy

Despite the racism, he finished at the head of his class.

assigned to hunt down a communist

War

when

warfare

assembled by Touby. Following the war

he attended the national police academy, the only Hmong
filled

waned

relinquished his role as the

career had begun near the end of World

for the

The lowland Lao who

influence

relief of

man

in

to that point.

ostracized him.

1950 he was

In

had expanded Ho Chi
the

unit,

earning him

high praise from the local French commanders, and an appointment to officer

candidate school. Like everything else he

was commissioned
Vang Po remained
of his tribesmen.

in

in

tried,

he succeeded

the Royal Lao Army. After the 1954
the Royal Army, rising to

command

in this

Geneva agreement,

a battalion composed

117

Vang Po spent

the time between 1954 and 1960 either running from Viet

Minh invasions or conducting

counter-guerrilla operations along the border with

Vietnam. During these years of running and hiding, coming out to

harass the enemy, Vang Po became an expert

117

course and

fight

at field craft, forged his

and

Hmong

Wars, 268-274.
Warner, Shooting at the Moon, 26-31; Prados, President's Secret
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into

a tenacious,

tightly knit guerrilla force

observed the destruction of Vietnamese

and, perhaps most importantly,

by French

units

experiences convinced Vang Po of several things.

air

power. These

he wanted

First,

to

command

a large conventional force. He was an expert

guerrilla fighter, but

he had seen

what

in

the open, and he

was hooked.

big

guns and

The American

new and

aid

better

ultimately

bad

big units could

promised

accomplish

him an opportunity to

to provide

weapons. Second, he came

for his people.

When Kong

test his skills with

to believe that the

Le staged

coup

his

communists were
1960 Vang Po

in

agreed with the former's assessment that the leadership of the Royal Army was
corrupt and insensitive.

He knew and

liked

contemporary on the value of a neutral
influence of the Pathet Lao

was

Kong

coalition

Le, but

he disagreed with

his

government, believing that the

destined to subvert the

new

regime. Having

fought the Pathet Lao's sponsors, the Viet Minh, for most of two decades, Vang

Po decided

to

Government.

throw his

and

that of his people

in

with the Royal

118

Vang Po's

Hmong were

lot

alliance with the

Americans was not easily arrived

not Lao nationalists any

at.

The

more than they were communists.

In

the

past they had worked as porters and guides for the Viet Minh. The Americans

earned

their allegiance

by convincing Vang Po that the communists were

on taking over Laos and divesting the Hmong
confirmed Vang Po's

own

arrangement was good

Vang

118

Po's fighters far

suspicions.

Once

for both parties.

more

of their land.

arrived at, the

Such assertions

Hmong-American

American weapons and

effective than they

Warner, 30.

79

intent

training

had ever been on the

made

battlefield.

Better performance on the battlefield

and

fighters,

such
the

loyalty

meant higher morale among the Hmong

this translated into intense loyalty to their leader,

came

foreign aid that

prominence and, he believed, allowed him

At the

He

had brought Vang Po

it,

Hmong

lived

knew

Vang Po's

of

forces were important to

and operated

the terrain as well as anyone

The PARU teams executed the

initial

in

the strategically

alleviated potential cultural

students.

and language

The Thais were

not

Hmong,

Hmong. Using

Hmong, except up

close.

Under

but they

of the early training brought

for

were a

difficult to

Lair's leadership, the

conducted a series of three-day camps

profile

between the

Americans, and had the added advantage of being

and

the world.

in

training of the

barriers

vital

of the Plain of Jars,

Thai soldiers allowed Lair to keep the American operation low

PARU

and

trainers

lot

the

and

their

closer than the

distinguish from the

quickly set up and

1,000 of Vang Po's Hmong. The

more American CIA operatives and a vast

expansion of Operation Momentum. By May the

PARU

and

American

their

counterparts had trained nearly 5,000 Hmong, with more waiting

The

of

to

most dangerous enemy

Vang Po's own home was just east

northern provinces.
his tribesman

with

to fight the

the loyalty and lethality of

the Americans, because the

success

In turn,

therefore remained loyal to the King and his American backers.

same time,

Hmong

Po.

earned Vang Po greater control and prestige as a regional leader

Hmong. War, and the

his people.

Vang

in

operation would eventually equip and train more than 20,000

without the knowledge or approval of the Royal Lao

80

Army

the wings.

Hmong,

often

leadership, or the

American Ambassador.

119

But there

was more going on

in

Laos that would

arguably render Momentum's early success moot.
In

the early months of 1961 the

PEO

continued to coordinate the Special

Forces training of the Royal Lao Army under various operational names. What

had begun as Hotfoot soon became Operation White

Star, with advisors

assigned to several levels of the Royal Army. (White Star advisors would also

be used

later

to

augment Operation Momentum.) 120 On February 6 th General
,

Lemnitzer informed the President that Heintges' replacement as Chief of the

PEO, Andrew

Boyle, had requested nine additional training teams.

The next day, Undersecretary

of

Defense Kenneth Landon offered the

President his assessment of the situation, arguing that American military aid
misdirected.

He

believed that the Royal

American advice and equipment
sufficient.

can

Army was being made dependent upon

for survival,

The remedy, he proposed, was

development of forces
live off

Southeast Asia," he

and could not be made

self-

to direct military assistance

toward the

that could "operate as guerrillas at the village level

the countryside. This

is

and

the kind of war the communists conduct

told the President,

was

"and

119

this is the kind of

war we should

31-34, 35-42; Sananikone, 77-79; Conboy, Shadow War, 57-66; Parker
several estimates.
43; figures vary, these represent the rough median among
Ibid,

in

xi;

Castle, 38-

contends
There are differing accounts of the origins of Operation White Star. Stevenson
under Eisenhower. Conboy and Castle,
that it began as the Hmong training operation in 1960,
training mission and was
however, say that White Star began as part of the PEO's Royal Army
The point of the matter is that the Hmong
later used to augment the Hmong training mission.
Momentum and White Star probably
under Vang Po were part of the Royal Army. Therefore
shared personnel and resources liberally.
120

81

121

conduct."

A week

later

Landon

memo to W.W.

Rostow. He said

Southeast Asia

will

to redirect

be won or

reiterated his point

bluntly,

"The war

lost in the villages."

American assistance toward a force

even more

Laos and elsewhere

in

122

a

directly in

in

Again he stressed the need

that could bolster village level

support for the Royal Government.

Landon's arguments demonstrate that

at least

Washington understood the essential elements
it.

Moreover, here

is

knew. What Landon

embassy

in

evidence that they were
told

Kennedy

some

of the people

of people's war,

telling

and how

essentially confirmed the

assessment

it

program was misdirected and

would not produce long term

results favorable to United States interests.

promoting a program that would do what the current

PEO

support for the Royal Government, which

local

representative nor popular.

way

to

weaken

123

Broadening

its

support

121

first

was

neither widely

the people

was

the

the appeal and the power of the Pathet Lao.

deployment of nine new Special Forces teams

March the

He was

organization had not,

among

Shortly thereafter, despite Landon's arguments,

early

in

could not, namely that

military assistance

By

of the

Vientiane that military assistance alone could not produce security

Eisenhower's Army-centered

only sure

to fight

the President what they

Laos. Moreover, Landon had pinpointed the reason that

develop

in

to

three teams were arriving

Kennedy approved the

augment Operation White
in

Laos.

The President

Star.

also

NSF, CS: Laos,
Kenneth P Landon, "Laos and the Indian Ocean Area", 7 February 61,

JFKL
122

Kenneth

P.

CS: Laos, JFKL.
Landon, "Community Action Teams", 13 February 61, NSF,
Countries, Laos, JFKL.

Dean Rusk "Ambassador Brown's Call", 2 February 61, POF,
Royal Government's
Rusk reiterated Ambassador Brown's assessment of the
123

82

standing.

approved the increase of the Royal Army

had already been mustered
Washington.

into service

to

a

total of

32,322 men, many of whom

by Phoumi, without an okay from

124

Kennedy's decision to expand Operation White Star
a consistent trend

decision making on Laos.

in his

things were going poorly,

Even when advised

to

Kennedy reacted by

seems more

that

misunderstood, that his idea of

he had

less confidence

in

who was

in

military

likes of

Landon and Rostow. Another

likely, is

flexible

that

Kennedy's views have been

response focused on the

military,

and

that

the non-military aspects of CI.

From January through
success. The

increasing the level of military aid.

perhaps he misunderstood the notion of

countehnsurgency presented by the

and one

reports indicated that

do otherwise, Kennedy consistently chose a

option, suggesting that

possibility,

When

at this point illustrates

early March, Operation

Hmong were eager trainees,

turn loyal to the King.

Momentum met with

fierce fighters

Military confrontations

and

in

Vang

Po,

between the Pathet Lao

and the Hmong had been sporadic, with the smaller Hmong
generally shooting and moving, rarely squaring off

loyal to

great

guerrilla forces

a decisive engagement.

Operation White Star likewise continued apace, although assessments of the

Royal Lao Army by
told,

their

American

the early spring of 1961

were not always complementary.

showed promise,

flowing into Laos and a tenacious

124

trainers

new

with

more equipment and advisors

guerrilla force

Warner, 50-51.
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All

being developed to fight the

Pathet Lao on their
his intention to

In late

own

terms.

keep Laos from

Kennedy was
falling to

February, he also took his

well

on

his

way

to demonstrating

the communists.

steps toward a diplomatic solution,

first

appealing to Burma, Malaya and Cambodia to
form a neutral commission to

mediate

was

in

Laos. This proposal, originally requested by
Laotian King Vatthana,

rejected by both

Cambodia and Burma, who

Malaya abstained from

felt

it

offering a decision either way.

Norodom Sihanouk applauded Kennedy's good
fourteen-member conference

to formulate a

would be unproductive.

Cambodian Prince

intentions, but

peace agreement, an idea favored

by the Soviets, Chinese, and the Pathet Lao. 125 Kennedy had
over the disappointment he must have

felt at

personal diplomacy. Military developments

proposed a

the failure of his

in

little

time to mull

first effort in

Laos were about

to take

a decisive

turn for the worse.

In

became

March the weaknesses of America's
apparent.

programs

military aid

The Pathet Lao, strengthened by an

Laos

in

infusion of Soviet aid,

mounted a major offensive and routed the Royal Army. On March 7 th W.W.
,

Rostow summarized the

situation for

Kennedy, saying,

Communists

"[the]

launched a probing offensive against Phoumi's men. Without much

boys

fell

back, apparently past the crucial crossroads.

Phoumi's forces have the capacity

125

William

J.

to rally..."

126

It

Jorden, "Cambodia Spurns Kennedy Appeal", The

our

not yet clear whether

is

On March

fight,

9

th

New

the Pathet Lao

York Times, 26 February

61.
126

W W. Rostow, "Situation

in

Laos as of Task Force Meeting, March

NSF, CS: Laos, JFKL.

84

7,

1961", 7

March

61,

captured the "crucial crossroads", a
strategically important junction that controlled
road access between the Plain of Jars
and Vientiane.

Rostow's description of the

use of the words "our boys"
it

Phoumi's troops

into

combat,

presence as key

to the

is likely

that

this

to the President that a

their

memo

clearly

is

in this

case,

failure.

saw

their

Second,

"probing offensive", and the apparent concern
it,

suggests that the operation to

equip the Royal Army wasn't bearing much

Events continued

of his

First, his

choice of words could indicate that he

Royal Army's success, or

Army by a

on two counts.

American Special Forces accompanied

over whether they could rebound from

arguments

interesting

is

The tone

is illustrative.

disappointed. Since

the rout of the Royal

fighting

fruit,

spiral

Lao advancing and the American armed and

and

further strengthening Landon's

new approach was

downward

train

required.

through March, with the Pathet

trained Royal

Army

back.

falling

In

the face of a growing debacle, the State Department began developing a plan to

move

a multi-national force from

member

nations of the Southeast Asian Treaty

Organization into Laos. The plan called for a unilateral conventional force

deployment by the United States
urgency of the
deterioration,

and the

under attack or

127

SEATO

situation for the President

fall,

failed to act.

when he

failure of negotiations

Phoumi Nosavan meant

later,

if

that

"if

told

Rostow conveyed the

him that

its

rapid

between Souvanna Phouma and

Lao resistance crumbles and major centers come

we may have

to

move

very swiftly indeed..."

127

Two days

alarmed by the communist advances, Kennedy placed Marine Corps and

W.W. Rostow,

NSF, Subjects,

"Joint Chiefs of Staff-Department of State

Policy Planning, JFKL; Parker,

xi.

85

Meeting of March 17

th
,

1961",

Navy
Laos

units stationed at

to

augment the

Okinawa on high

Air

America

On March 27 th Rostow
,

at Fort

fleet.

alert,

and sent 14 new helicopters

128

returned from a

visit to

the Special Forces School

Bragg with a report from three soldiers who had

six-month deployment to Laos. His news
failure of

Rostow

American

aid to prop

that "Phoumi's

over his commanders

uncertain."

field units

129

all

from their

bad, but helped explain the

up the Royal Army. The three operatives

extremely

forward from government

and from the

was

just returned

problems have been worse than

is

dumps

to

dilute...

we

told

thought... his control

our supplies have not been moving

to the field units... the

communications net

has been feeble and has made

This evidence, provided by advisors

air

to

drops extremely

who had been

in

the

the Royal Army, suggests that the corruption that so incensed Kong Le

field

was

with

still

present and had a severely detrimental effect on the performance of the Army.

Moreover,
aid

it

suggests that assessments which argued

programs were
In

for

correct.

the midst of the March

crisis,

Rostow

offered the President his

opinion as to the efficacy of the administration's efforts

believed that he had detected a dangerous tendency

separation of diplomacy and military action.
of the

he

communist practice

felt,

128

a redirection of military

in

in

He noted

Laos thus

that this

was

the opposite

of carefully orchestrating the two. Separating the two,

watered down the diplomatic

efforts

and forced eventual

Conboy, 51 Castle, 29-30.

W W. Rostow,

He

U.S. policy toward the

;

129

far.

own

"Visit to Fort Bragg",

27 March 61, NSF, M&M, JFKL.

86

military

intervention to

be larger than otherwise would have been required.

argued that when diplomatic
political solution

efforts

were abandoned

was abandoned along

battle that's put in front of

could not and should not develop the long-term

almost every case.
"on

how to

"I

think

we

political solutions

to

them, they

required

in

should put our minds steadily to work..." he said,

orchestrate diplomacy and force better...

have a sharper notion as

to the military, the eventual

with them. Soldiers aren't politicians, he

Kennedy, and while they may win the

told

he

Finally,

what our

In

the case of Laos,

political objective is..."

130

One

might expect

Rostow's suggestion, coupled with the negative report from the

field,

spurred Kennedy to overhaul the CI programs

appears

Laos.

in

What

it

we must

have

to

have

to

done, however, was drive him to deepen current commitments.

Perhaps

anticipating a Republican attack

on

his increased

Laos, Kennedy took his case to the American people.
the Pathet Lao gaining ground daily on the Royal
of

American advisors being shipped

hammered

the point that Laos

from America, but the world

Southeast Asia

own
to

to the training

critical to

small,"

be endangered

Army and

if

he

increasing

it

clear to the

said, adding,

W W. Rostow,

American people and

its

87

is

"The security of

far

all

away

all

neutral independence.

to the world that

10 March 61, NSF, CS: Laos, JFKL.

numbers

camps, Kennedy repeatedly

the entire region. "Laos

Laos loses

in

23, 1961, with

safety runs with the safety of us all— in neutrality observed by us

make

130

will

is

was

On March

involvement

all.

we want

Its

I

in

want
Laos

is

peace, not war; a

truly neutral

concluded at the conference

government, not a cold war pawn; a settlement

table, not

on the

battlefield."

131

Having thus publicly committed the United States to supporting
a free and

Kennedy continued

neutral Laos,

Hmong. He also stepped up

military aid to the

Royal Government and the

his diplomatic efforts.

On March 26 th and 27 th he
,

held separate talks with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
and Soviet

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The talks succeeded
International Control

up

at

Geneva

managed

1954

in

to establish

factions fighting over
In April

to

in

ensure a peaceful

Laos had yet

to

of the disaster at the

Bay

May
to

1 1

,

originally set

They also

although two of the three

132
it.

Cuba splashed across world

into the

of Pigs

group

transition to neutrality.

agree

failed invasion of

Laos were forced

reactivating the

international monitoring

a cease-fire date of

1961 the

and operations
word

Commission, an

in

headlines,

background temporarily. Along with

came

the

news

that the President of the

United States had decided against using American troops to ensure the success
of the operation.

credibility

Kennedy, fearing such news might further damage

his

by making him seem indecisive, took a small but important step

to

discourage any such thoughts on the part of the communists. He ordered the

PEO

in

Laos

to

have

its

personnel shuck their

uniforms, effectively transforming the

1J1

132

PEO

civilian attire in

into

an overt

Warner, 48.

FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXIV, 138-139;

Castle, 40.

88

favor of military

Military

Assistance

Advisory Group, a position

was tantamount

it

had

held, covertly, since 1959. 133

to authorizing direct, overt

Kennedy's order

to the

PEO seems,

Such an order

ground combat.

on the surface,

to

have been

motivated by concern over national and personal
prestige.

A

month

however, the Chief of the
L.L. Lemnitzer, that the

level.

He had asked

overt,

by wearing

134

level.

and

In this

it

was a

had complained

to Joint Chiefs

Pathet Lao had Vietnamese advisors

that his Special Forces training

their uniforms,

case, there

military necessity.

Laos,

PEO

to

Chairman General

down

far

company
to

have been a coincidence between

One

shift in policy.

of

its

go

as battalion

Whatever the reasons behind the decision

small but important

to

teams be allowed

and be assigned down as

seems

earlier,

effects

political

go public

to

was

to force

reckoning between the United States and the Soviet Union over what

was now

overt aid by the former to a country

also led,

almost

inevitably, to the first

In early April,

Royal Army

in

which the

American casualties

in

had a stake.

It

a

Laos.

the Pathet Lao launched yet another offensive against the

the vicinity of the Plain of Jars.

in

latter

in

One

battalion of Royal forces,

advised by "Team Moon", a Special Forces advisory team led by a U.S. Army
captain of the

same name, had been

junction captured by the Pathet Lao

fighting for

in their

communist forces prepped Team Moon's

over a month to regain the road

March

offensive.

positions with

On 22

heavy

launched an assault that overran the Royal Army battalion and
advisors.

133

Two

of the team's four

members were

killed

Goldstein, American Policy in Laos, 239; Sananikone, 77.

89

April the

artillery,

its

then

Special Forces

during the assault.

Two

were captured,

including Captain

second escape attempt. The

his

sixteen months

in captivity.

Moon, who was
fourth

by

later killed

his captors after

member of the team was

released after

135

Having been badly routed on the Plain of Jars, Phoumi ordered
into last-ditch blocking positions to protect
Vientiane

Pathet Lao,

who now

held most of the

Laos and seemed capable of going as

critical

and Luang Prabang from the

routes to and from the heart of

as they wished.

far

his forces

On

April

26

th
,

Acting

Secretary of State Chester Bowles, reiterating the assessment of his

Ambassador to
"The

Laos, Winthrop Brown, painted a troubling picture for Kennedy.

military situation in

"with...

Communist

Laos

is

becoming

intolerable,"

he reported,

offensives continuing against key areas.

They could

result in

the capture of Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Paksane, effective bisection of the
country and control of the

allowed to get that

Vietnam.

He

far,

Mekong

basin areas."

136
If

the Pathet Lao were

Bowles argued, they could threaten Thailand and

then warned the President that Souvanna Phouma's efforts to

establish a fourteen-nation conference on Laos would turn into "a
victory party"

if

the Pathet Lao were allowed to continue their operations

unchecked. His recommendations

and massive

134

135

this

136

military intervention.

General Andrew

J.

Boyle,

to

to

Kennedy included consideration

of direct

137

"Message

Castle, 31; Conboy, 53-54;

one seems

communist

1

134",

22 March 61, NSF, CS: Laos, JFKL.

Warner 56-57. Accounts

be the consensus.

FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXIV, 140-141.

90

of the

demise

of

Team Moon

vary, but

Records from a series

make

1961

intervention

it

Kennedy

clear that

in

of meetings held

April

April 29,

27

th
,

Acting Secretary Bowles reported to

the consensus of a meeting of the administration on Laos.
all

that without direct U.S. intervention

the unanimous view

was

to that question

He

told

present at the meeting accepted the notion
all

of Southeast Asia might

against introducing

responded by asking what

split

27 and

did not wish to risk a major conventional

On

the Secretary of State that, while

answer

April

Laos, or the confrontation with China and the Soviet Union
that

such an action might provoke.

Dean Rusk on

between

US

SEATO was doing

in

be endangered,

forces into Laos.

response to the

138

Rusk

crisis.

was, simply, not much. The members of

The

SEATO

were

over what to do about Laos, with the majority apparently holding their breath

and hoping the cease-fire would take place as scheduled.

The recent and

painful

memory

of the

Bay

of Pigs almost certainly

weighed heavily on Kennedy's mind during these tense days of debate over what
to

do about Laos. There seems

possibility of full-scale

if

there

was

to

little

doubt that

war with the Soviets

his administration

or Chinese over

considered the

Laos very

real.

Still,

be a superpower showdown over Southeast Asia, the documents

suggest, Kennedy preferred

it

to

be over Thailand or Vietnam, not Laos.

139

Nevertheless, Kennedy and his advisors continued to feel strongly that the
U.S. had to prevent a communist takeover of Laos. They were

138
Ibid.,

144-156.

Ibid.,

146-147; Castle, 41

139

140

in

a

Author and date sanitized, "Defense Assessment of Merits of Intervention
Countries, Laos, JFKL.

91

difficult

in

Laos",

POF,

position, stuck

between two

distasteful choices, with apparently

assistance they could count on. The situation
was, perhaps,

Kennedy's

military advisors,

who told him

that "[the

little

allied

a

clarified

bit

by

communists] have breached

the Annamite chain, which forms a natural
barrier between Vietnam and Laos.

The next
area..."

barrier

140

the Mekong. After the Mekong, the

is

The same advisors cautioned Kennedy

way

is

open

to the entire

that the effects of non-

intervention included confirmation, for potential insurgents, that
global

communism was
Such a

ascendant; that the West

was

effectively losing the

Cold War.

they contended, would encourage a rash of violent communist

belief,

insurgencies. Acting on such advice, but obviously uneasy about his position,

Kennedy ordered
China Sea, an
rattling his

the Joint Task Force from

indication that

saber. This

he was prepared

may have been an

the Soviets of his resolve, especially

The world
bluffing

game, or

from capturing
cease-fire

Phoumi's

was

he was

of Laos.

hammered

men were

averted, for the

military aid to

141

all

Conboy,

in

did not get to find out

if

Okinawa

truly

if

wake

st

1

risk

South

tempt the Soviets by

convince the Pathet Lao and

of the

Kennedy was

prepared to

On May

to at least

effort to

the

into position in the

war

to

Bay

of Pigs.

playing a diplomatic

keep the communists

the Pathet Lao accepted the terms of the

out by the British and the Soviets.

also ordered to stand down.

141

The

Two days

later

confrontation over Laos

moment, by diplomacy. Subsequently, America suspended

Laos and the cease-fire went

54.

92

into effect

as scheduled on

May

11

th
.

Five days

later,

on May 16 th the Second Geneva Conference was convened

to

,

settle the three-sided dispute

On June
in

Vienna.

In

3

rd

and 4

th
,

over the country.

Kennedy met

with Soviet Premier Nikita

Khrushchev

a contentious meeting over a range of issues from Berlin to nuclear

disarmament, the one thing the two leaders agreed on was that Laos was not
worth a superpower confrontation. They issued a

statement following the

joint

meeting, part of which "...reaffirmed their support of a neutral and independent
Laos... and of international

independence..."
stage.

142

He handed

With

agreements

that,

and

for insuring that neutrality

Kennedy's intervention

in

the reigns of American involvement

Laos entered a new

in

Laos

to Averill

Harriman, the American delegate to the Geneva Conference. Overtly, America

was now

involved only diplomatically

and White Star teams remained
continued unabated

The
that

until

May

in

in

The Momentum, PARU

the Kingdom.

the country, however, and the secret war

when

1962,

the

Geneva Conference ended.

Lao onslaught

implication of the Pathet

Kennedy's program

in

Laos had

failed.

March and

of

The developments

April

143

1961

is

that led to the

second Geneva Conference, moreover, confirm several things about Kennedy's
early intervention

in

Laos.

First,

most

of his

programs were holdovers,

extensions, or expansions of those initiated by the Eisenhower administration.

Second,

all

of the

spent training the

programs were

Hmong and

Government more responsive

142

militarily oriented.

the Royal

Army

The

time,

did nothing to

money and

make

to or representative of a significant

Stevenson, The End of Nowhere, 154; Castle, 42.
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blood

the Royal

number

of

its

people. Third, the failure of the

shortcomings and

Kennedy

administration to recognize these

a comprehensive CI plan, of the sort that the

institute

President's advisors (including his

own

the failure of military intervention.

Kennedy believed

response. His brother, Robert

F.

brother)

were promoting,

led inevitably to

a strategy of flexible

in

Kennedy had provided him

with an

Army

report

that laid out the fundamentals of a holistic CI doctrine, designed for
the type of

enemy he

faced

Laos. Rostow, Landon and his

in

embassy

Laos had

staff in

all

counseled him to attack the disease, not the symptom, by addressing the basic
social

and

political

exclusively.

problems of Laos, rather than

The path was

there;

old, partisan style CI of the

Kennedy just

fighting the Pathet

failed to

change. While the Kennedy administration
programs, they

tried to

Hmong

conducted by the

as did the

airlift

days.

resorting to the

still

in

Laos was bound

maintained

its

of supplies.

The

The Hmong and

around the Plain of Jars.

Momentum and White

Star

Much

from the

military aid

PEO

and

its

program of the pre-cease-

the Pathet Lao continued to skirmish

In short,

of the

teams continued,

organization and activity of the

little

to

covert aid

avoid obvious violation of the cease-fire.

operators apparently differed
fire

it,

Korea days.

With the onset of negotiations, American policy

training

take

Lao

in

the mountains

as the peace talks dragged out among the

three factions vying for control of Laos, Kennedy's misdirected CI program

dragged along with

it.

Despite a brief but intense flare-up

which Kennedy deployed 3,000 Marines

in

May

1962, during

to Thailand in preparation for a

94

move

into Laos, the

most

Geneva Conference

offered a year during which Laos was, for
the

part, out of the spotlight. 144

Geneva Changes
The outcome
foreign intervention
"the

maintenance of

Phouma's

Laos.

The agreement announced

neutrality

Vientiane group." 145 There

was

seven seats

to

in

be a

failed

called for the demobilization of

July 1962 called for

coalition

government, with Phouma's

In this

and other respects, the 1962

1954 agreement. The 1962 agreement,

most

armed forces

of the

composed

of

was

of fourteen nations, which

all

to

sides,

agreement

and the withdrawal

of

Commission would be
to the Declaration

all

called for an

end

all

foreign military personnel.

especially interested

on the

to

Neutrality of

Laos

in

the

too,

and the

be an International

would monitor

compliance with the terms of the agreement. Most importantly
aid programs, the

of

by both the Pathet Lao and the

creation of a smaller, integrated national army. There

Control Commission,

in

change the nature

the national assembly, and the Pathet Lao and

Phoumi's nationalists getting four each.

agreement resembled the

to

by a regime presided over by Prince Souvanna

neutralists, but strongly influenced

neutralists holding

Laos

in

Geneva Conference promised

of the

in

the Rules

for the

American

foreign military intervention

The

latter.

International Control

Article

1

of the Protocol

clearly defined "foreign military

personnel" as "members of foreign military missions... advisers, experts,
instructors, consultants, technicians, observers... and foreign civilians

144

Parker,

xiii

95

connected

with the supply, maintenance, storing and
utilization of
interesting that the delegates included the
final

Such a broad and

civilians.

war

materials."

146
It

is

passage regarding foreign

clear definition signaled the

end of the PEO,

Operation White Star and the CIA's training of the Hmong.

The deadline
International Control

for troop

withdrawal

was

set for October 7, 1962.

Commission set up checkpoints

The

to count foreign soldiers

as

they exited the country. The checkpoints accounted for 666 American
advisors

on

their

way

out between August and September.

person station within the

US

The CIA maintained a two-

Mission at Vientiane, ostensibly to monitor

communist compliance with the Geneva agreement. 147 With only weeks

to

go

before the deadline, however, the Commission reported that only 40 of an

estimated 7,000 Vietnamese advisors and soldiers had evacuated Laos. This
inaction by North

initiated

to

Vietnam was a clear

another round of discussions

Kennedy

to

adhere

strictly to

the

violation of the

Washington.

in

Geneva agreements and
Averill

Geneva agreement. Such

part of the United States,

he argued, might convince the

Vietnamese could not be

trusted,

the communist camp.
that the North

via the

discipline

on the

neutralists that the North

and might thereby push Phouma

farther from

intelligence estimates told the President (incorrectly)

Vietnamese appeared

South Vietnam

145

US

Harriman appealed

Ho Chi Minh

interested

Trail

George Modelski, Working Paper No.

2,

in

maintaining their access to

through Laos, but were not interested

International

Conference on the Settlement of the

Laotian Question, 1961-2, (Canberra, Australia: Department of International Relations, The
Australian National University, 1962), 37.
146
Ibid.,

147

147-148.

Parker,

xiii.

96

in

turther

encroachment

violations but took

into the country.

no further

action.

Kennedy, therefore, protested the

148

slowly but surely closed up shop and
CI Efforts

Kennedy's

left

military advisors in

the kingdom to

its

uneasy

Laos

neutrality.

a Neutral Laos

in

There were non-military operations active

in

A

Laos.

non-governmental

organization called International Voluntary Services
(which Warner describes as

a private forerunner to the Peace Corps) had a representative,
Edgar
the Laotian highlands as early as

May

1960. His

was

there to teach

Buell, in

modern

farming techniques, but just as often ended up providing intelligence
to the CIA

and

liaison

know

between the other Americans and the

quite well.

to look ever

149

more

influence events

On
sent a

July

neutrality,

important, as the Special

in

3,

With the advent of

Laos without

locals,

(CI)

began

for counterinsurgencies in

American opportunities

of the Special

Group

Southeast Asia. He began the

ways

to exert

(CI) detailing

"relates to public health."

148

ways

He proposed

to

memo
in

"One

to train

fruitful

area",

he

Staff,

a proposal

by offering the

Laos

limited

anticommunist influence. They needed

to influence events.

to

Geneva agreements.

opinion that the expected formation of a coalition government

for

to look for

1962, General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

memo to the other members

more deeply

he had come

missions such as Buell's began

Group

violating the

whom

told

to look

them,

a cadre of young Laotians from

FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXIV, 889-907; Stevenson, 178-179; Warner,

74-75.

As

always, there are several estimates of Vietnamese troops in Laos, ranging from 5,000 to 10,000.
7,000 is Parker's figure and represents the median estimate.
149

Warner,

1-9.

97

the "hinterlands" to provide medical aid to
the chronically under-treated peasants

Furthermore,

"It

would develop a body

young men who are favorably

of active

oriented toward the United States and who, at
the
stature

among

their

countrymen.

Finally,

it

same

time, enjoy influential

would provide, through the overt

between the United States agencies and these young medical
men,

relationship

a continuing opportunity both to infuse our ideas

into the

Laotian people and to

procure local information of continuing value." 150 The Special Group,
with the

Department of
way, set

to

aspects of

State,

USAID, the Department

work designing a program

to

of

engage

Defense and USIA leading the
in this

CI.

The medical program

established by the Special Group

by USAID. They recruited Doctor Charles Weldon and

McCreedy

and other non-combat

developed a

stellar reputation

where they had solved the

as public health doctors

island's chronic

without a job.

Weldon found himself

in

in

among

the

Hmong, he

For The

McCreedy found

herself

USAID

the USAID's Refugee

set about establishing an inoculation

doctor didn't know, according to Warner,

"Memo

Laos,

now

program, basic medical training and a system of

Lemnitzer,

team had

American Samoa,

the grip of a crippling

bureaucracy. But with the help of Edgar Buell,

Coordinator

in

wife

Doctor Patricia

problems with tuberculosis,

Once

elephantiasis and high infant mortality.

his wife,

The husband and

to run the operation in Laos.

was administered

Members

of

rural health clinics.

was how

The SGCI", 3

98

What

the

well his public health plan

July 62,

JFKL

dovetailed with the USAID's overall
development

expanding

efforts to

effort,

and

"with the

re-

organize the Laotians of the countryside." 151

Doctor Weldon's medical program was part of a
large

by the Department of States' Bureau of Far Eastern
the program

CIAs

was an overhaul

of

American

Affairs.

effort,

spearheaded

The main focus

financial aid to Laos,

of

which had been

characterized by direct budgetary support, which had proven
ineffective and

allowed corruption to flourish

in

Vientiane.

an elimination of cash grants

in

favor of "reimbursable financing" and expanded

imports to Laos, both of which were to be

The new

financial

package

called for

by U.S. and Lao

tightly controlled

customs.

The overhauled
Project Program, a

fiscal

$13

year 1963 aid package

million initiative for rural

for

Laos also included the

development, teacher training

and medical assistance, including Weldon's operation. The Project Program also
included proposals for the establishment of Lao National Radio, a telephone
plant for Vientiane,

The
political

Project

and

and refugee resettlement and

Program seems

finally to

relief for

the

Hmong. 152

have incorporated the

social reform into America's CI efforts in Laos.

principle of

Improved farming,

education and public health would almost certainly produce a Laotian population

who

were, as Lemnitzer hoped, "favorably oriented towards the United States."

Warner, 104.

FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XXIV, 909-910.
Lemnitzer

"Memo

For The

Members

of the SGCI", 3 July 62, JFKL.

99

153

In reality,

however,

many

of the Project Program's goals

address problems created or exacerbated among
the
military aid

American

were designed

Hmong by the

earlier

programs. Following the Geneva agreements and the
evacuation of

military advisors, the Viet

offensives against the

Minh and Pathet Lao had launched major

Hmong. The Hmong, who had fought so

effectively

the American aid program, soon found themselves
running low on
supplies, including food

number

to

all

under

manner

of

and ammunition. Harriman had authorized a small

of "mercy mission" supply drops to

insufficient to stave off the vastly larger

Vang Po's

communist

forces, but they

forces.

154

1962, a communist attack on the village of Ban Ban forced

In late

were

August

some 6,000

people,

mostly Hmong, to flee south. After running for most of the day, the refugees

camped

in

a high valley, where the communists surprised and massacred them.

According to one account, "Children were snatched from
hurled with head-crushing force against rocks. Old

the legs and

left

executioners.

to die alone,

Women were

abandoned both by

that survived fled

As word spread

in

their

young and by

raped, then disemboweled."

155

their

most

of

them Hmong.

of the massacre, villages

among

the

hills

Muong Meo, Edgar

emptied before

some 20,000

Buell enlisted the aid of Air

Castle, 51.

Don

A.

in

a panic.

refugees crowding the village of

155

shot

According to Jane

the onrushing Viet Minh and Pathet Lao. Shortly thereafter, with

154

arms and

men and women were

Hamilton-Merritt, the attack killed 1,300 refugees, again

Those

their mothers'

Schanche, Mister Pop, (New York: David McKay Company, 1970), 199, quoted

Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 121.
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in

America

operating

(still

in

neighboring Thailand) to disperse them before
they

could be cornered and attacked.
Meanwhile, Doctor Weldon and his half-trained

Hmong medics

tended the sick and wounded.

The communist

attacks continued, with

Vang Po's

dwindling forces trying

desperately to defend their tribesmen, but being
pushed from one mountaintop to
another.

In

September,

series of attacks,

after nearly

Hmong were

200,000

Souvanna Phouma requested

Hmong, a request echoed by

the CIA agents

that the

still

forced to flee another

US resume

present

in

Laos, and the

American ambassador. 156 This request brought a resurgence

accompany

the Program Project

among

resumed, and the CIA once again began
time from

its

base across the Mekong

In April

erstwhile

In

ally.

in

the

Hmong. Supply

to fight

its

guerrilla

of military aid to

flights to

war

in

was now

other.

Vang Po

Laos, this

Thailand.

1963, the Pathet Lao attacked Kong Le's neutralist army, their
In

May, the State Department authorized supply drops

a twist of irony that seems entirely predictable given the situation

U.S.

aid to the

supplying both

Communist

Vang Po and Kong

violations of the

Le,

who

Geneva agreements

in

to

Kong

Le.

Laos, the

frequently fought each

continued, with no

reaction from the international committee designed to deal with such

infractions.

157

In

November, following Ngo Dinh Diem's assassination and the

subsequent turmoil

in

South Vietnam, the administration's attention was once

again diverted away from Laos. Kennedy's assassination a few days

156

Ibid,
157

122-123; Parker,

xiii.

Hamilton-Merritt, 123-126.
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later further

diverted national and global attention.

The North Vietnamese seized

the

opportunity to increase the flow of soldiers
and supplies into South Vietnam and

Laos, ensuring the extension of the
bloody struggle

the Laotian highlands.

in

Conclusion

The

return to military aid in the face of

agreements signals the

failure of

notion that an insurgency

recurrence of insurgency

never successful
I

in

communist

counterinsurgency

in

must enjoy popular support
in

Laos indicates

violations of the

Laos.

to

If

Geneva

one accepts the

be successful, then the

that America's CI

programs were

winning such support away from the Pathet Lao.

contend that the

failure of

Kennedy's CI programs

in

Laos was the

result

of an antiquated approach to counterinsurgency, a fundamental

misunderstanding of the type of

enemy he

timing and political circumstance.

framework available

to

faced and an impatience born of bad

As have shown, Kennedy had a workable
I

develop a comprehensive CI strategy. Robert

Kennedy had presented him

with a

document

that described

in detail

F.

the

parameters of effective counterinsurgency, and even provided suggestions as
tactics.

Rostow, Hilsman, Landon and others of

his advisors

to

had counseled him

to shift his focus from bolstering the military to building support for the Royal

Government. Moreover, Kennedy had an
believed

in flexible

argued, Kennedy

The

record

affinity for

covert operations and

response. Ignorance cannot be Kennedy's defense. As

was shown
shows

Kennedy's response was

that

the path; he just failed to take

when faced

it.

with deteriorating events

in

to repeatedly boost support for projects like

102

I've

Laos,

White Star

and Momentum;

and assist more forces

to train

provide those forces with more

appeared

insufficient, his

weapons and

next step

was

to fight the

Two

factors,

I

known about
in his

demonstrates

and

trainer

therefore,

military

that,

fighter.

was

believed

while the ideal

His highest

First,

in flexible

was

Kennedy's record

response, and

may have

the soldier-diplomat, the reality

visibility

project

in

not designed to provide anything

crisis in

He had

Laos erupted

was

the

the realm of limited war,

more than what

it

did,

a flexible

Kennedy had

to

early

in

Kennedy's term, when he was

and establish himself both domestically and

criticized

demonstrate that

further,

soil.

may have

trying to formulate policy

to

to

response.

internationally.

had

even moving task forces

look at Kennedy's creation of the Special Forces school

Second, the
still

such measures

the non-military aspects of CI, the two did not necessarily coincide

A

mind.

to

consistently to elevate the alert levels of

believe, explain his actions.

indicates that, while he

When

supplies.

his conventional forces in the region, three
times

within striking distance of Laotian

communists, or

Eisenhower's execution of containment, and

his theories

would work

make many

critical

better.

decisions

in

To complicate matters
the

wake

of the

Bay

of

Pigs disaster. The advice given by Schlesinger and Rostow, and the President's

subsequent

actions, indicate that

appear decisive and committed

he was heavily influenced by the need

in this

period. This often

meant he had

to

to take

action that would demonstrate relatively quick results. True counterinsurgency

a long-term proposition. While the military aspects of

103

it,

like

sending new

is

weapons

or

more

advisors, might bear immediate

change minds and win popular support.
instituted

a

holistic CI

In his

campaign, had he not

fruit,

defense,

felt

takes

it

much

longer to

Kennedy might

well

have

pressured to produce tangible

results quickly.

When Kennedy finally

did introduce a relatively unified CI effort

was more as a response than as a
misdirected at

that.

Most of the

programs executed by USAID

rural

after

the

Hmong

is

is

Moreover, the
efforts

hill

tribes

among them

the lowland Lao

who supported

have borne more

fruit

there,

was incomplete and

hill

that the military aid

tribes of northern Laos,

Hmong

aid to

do

programs of 1961 created
communists,

to fight the

When American

so.

aid

pickings for the better-armed communist forces.

were already

redundant.

it

true of the refugee resettlement

and making them dependent on American

Hmong were easy

Laos,

development, health care and educational

refugee problem, by convincing the

dried up, the

it

1962 targeted the

most notably the Hmong. The same
programs. The fact of the matter

and

prophylactic,

in

A

loyal to the royal

higher payoff target

the neutralists.

To do

in

Laos would have been

The programs

by gaining more support

rather that bolstering existing support.

government, making CI

so,

of

for the royal

USAID might
government,

however, would have required

time and patience that Kennedy apparently did not possess.

Such arguments beg the question:
comprehensive CI program
Without engaging

in

in

if

Laos, would

Kennedy had engaged
it

in

a more

have changed the outcome?

counter-factual history or extending the story beyond

Kennedy's assassination,

I

argue no. American CI doctrine

104

in

January 1961 had

changed

little

since the

first

manual was published

in

1958.

The

doctrine

called for the reorganization of
conventional units to fight insurgents.
until

the

new

Operations

version of the Army's overarching
operational manual,

was

published

in

It

FM

still

was

not

100-5,

1962 that the roots of counterinsurgency were

addressed. The implementing doctrinal
manuals,

FMs

31-22, U.S.

Army

Counterinsurgency Forces, 31-21, Guerrilla Warfare
and Special Operations
Forces, and 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations,
were not published

Such

until

1963.

doctrine included the valuable lessons from Malaya,
and incorporated the

views of

men

programs

importantly, the type of insurgents

likely to

autonomy.

far too late to

save Kennedy's

Laos.

in

More
were not

Hilsman and Rostow, but arrived

like

If

Kennedy faced

be defeated by anything short

one accepts the notion

that the

of granting

in

the Pathet Lao

Laos complete

Vietnamese had designs on

all

of

Southeast Asia, the picture becomes even more muddled. The Pathet Lao

wanted the Americans out
secure Laos

Magsaysay

for

did

communism. Even
in

the Philippines,

because the populace
for

as nationalists and

fighting

it

did not rally

liberators.

if

Vietnamese wanted the Pathet Lao

Kennedy had introduced

Even the

have been

to

land reform, as

would not have weakened the Pathet Lao,

around them

for

The Pathet Lao

economic reasons, but rather

also had the capacity to keep

as long as the aid of the Viet Minh continued. Unfortunately

that aid appears to

to

of Laos; the

for Laos,

limitless.

non-military CI

programs

that

Kennedy

did institute in

Laos

address the fundamental appeal of the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao were

105

failed

fighting for

independence. They had begun by

American takeover had been so complete

resisting the French, but the

that the Pathet

Lao had

naturally

transitioned to resisting the U.S. Like the French,
the U.S. had few options, short
of

or

abandoning operations

power

Laos altogether,

in

of the Pathet Lao.

would have diminished the

that

Neither the USAID, nor the CIA ever addressed the

appeal of the Pathet Lao, probably because they misinterpreted
at least in

1962 and 1963,

to

of Laotians, but their efforts

great

way to synchronize

have been attempting

clinics,

it.

They appear,

to win the hearts

were misdirected. The Special Group

the administration's CI efforts, but

indicate a fundamental misunderstanding of the

Laos. Health

role

enemy

its

and minds

(CI)

was a

documents also

they were faced with

schools and improved farming techniques

may have

in

kept

the support of those already sympathetic to the Royal Government, but they did
little

to

address the fundamental

political

circumstances of the country, or the

basic appeal of the Pathet Lao.

Even the best American

The

non-military

CI efforts

programs were too

group of people, and

in

any case

little,

in

Laos, then, were

too

late.

They were aimed

failed to attempt, let

The

military efforts

were no

better,

worse. Aid to the Royal Lao Army added a

quagmire,

General

Army

when Kong Le grew fed up

Staff.

The same

to leave

battlefield.

third faction in the

with the corruption

Aid to the

106

at the

Laos

wrong

to the

and from some perspectives,

it

Laotian

bred

aid proved incapable, moreover, of

a potent force on the

to failure.

alone produce, any

fundamental change. They certainly were not intended
Laotians.

doomed

in

far

political

the Army's

making the Royal

Hmong was an

unmitigated

disaster.

America armed, trained and supplied
a

the aid, and
fate of the

was hared pressed

to stave off their

Hmong demonstrates the

Laos: they were

all

overall

temporary measures

Americans who ran the operations

tribe that

own

grew dependent on

destruction without

weakness

of

Kennedy's CI

at best, destined to dry

left.

107

it.

The

efforts in

up when the

1

CHAPTER 4
EPILOGUE
Laos After Kennedy
Obviously,

assassination

in

US

intervention in

Laos did not end with Kennedy's

November 1963. The

situation

would get much bleaker

years to come, especially for the Hmong. By the end of 1963, the

20,000 American trained and equipped fighters

resisting the

Pathet Lao's Vietnamese benefactors continued to add

The Hmong fought as

new

raids against Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, and, after 1968, North
targets.

158

The communists,
weapons and,

conventional

dragged the
In

grew

in

hit

and run

Vietnamese Army

larger formations, with

often, conventional tactics.

The

contrast of styles

fall

of

Laos

to the

Laos grew and changed. The CIA

1975, the U.S. presence

to

225 men, with 50 advisors among the Hmong. Lyndon Johnson

combined communist
of their regular

who were no

army

War

forces.

to

in

power and scope
II

From there they ran ten

Parker,

units to the fray.

two more decades.

fighter-bombers and World
Thailand.

communists, but the

in

drastically increased the

158

fought

the intervening years between 1963 and the

communists
station

fight out for

in contrast,

the

Hmong had

ambushing and launching

guerrillas, harassing,

in

In

of the air operation, sending F-1

era B-26s to the Air America base at Udorn,
to twenty sorties per

day against the

1968 the North Vietnamese sent four battalions

hound the Hmong, whose casualties had mounted and

longer able to readily replenish their numbers.

Codename

1

In

the face of this

Mule, xv; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 121-126.
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development, the U.S. began to run
as many as 300 bombing missions
per day,
to

hammer the communist formations as

Jars.

But the end

escalated the war

was near for Laos and
in

gone was any hope

One

the

Hmong. Lyndon Johnson had

Vietnam along with the covert commitment

to Laos, but

for a successful counterinsurgency.

reason, obviously,

was

that the

They had always been a

insurgents.

they maneuvered across the Plain of

Hmong were

guerrilla force, but

effectively

now

now

the

the Pathet Lao held

the majority of power and were backed by
a large conventional force. Another

reason was that the American intervention had
reverted
the

number

of

Hmong

increased, the

men

dwindling even as American

US was

its

power

military roots.

in

certainly

in

no position

With

the region

hard pressed to find enough able-bodied young

an army. They were

to field

air

to

Hmong

to lobby for popular

support.

The war would drag on
1

973.

The

last

American

aircraft

leaving the country, and the

were

just beginning for the

After years of fighting

across the Mekong

found

their

way

until

Hmong,

to the

Hmong and
in

Thailand

in

communists.

others

159

159

The

in

the jungles,

Vang Po and

where they were

citizen.

Parker, 170.
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settled

of that year,

in

their people.

war

the Pathet Lao.

his family

1976. They and a few other

to the United States,

January

horrors of

who had opposed

tucked away from the genocide that was ravaging

an American

was declared

passed out of Laos on 22 February

and hiding

into

another cease-fire

escaped

Hmong

families

Montana, safely

Vang Po became

Back

Laos, the remaining

in

Hmong were

subjected to constant hounding

by the Pathet Lao. Between
1973 and 1991, they were attacked with
troops on the ground and,
increasingly, from the

Pathet Lao were tortured and maimed.
crippled as warnings to those
horribly, the

kill

those

who

Women

air.

were

Hmong who escaped

into the jungles.

their

resisted

publicly raped

Perhaps most

biological warfare

for

campaign

indicating that the Pathet

sponsors remained bent on destroying the tenacious

them

and children

to

Reports of chemical weapons

use surfaced repeatedly between 1978 and
1991,

and

Prisoners captured by the

resisted the Pathet Lao.

communists launched a chemical and

artillery,

hill

Lao

tribes that

had

so long. The U.S. did not intervene. 160
Laos' Connection to Vietnam

Events
growing war
that

Vietnam.

in

one can begin

and Vietnam
a CI

Laos during the Kennedy administration bore

in

operations.

Laos.

The new

it

was

partially

important

line that

connects Laos

because there was no doctrine

did from experience

its

lineage,

most

derived, the

new

in

1963 was not

for

in

the

likely, to

field.

The

argued,

such

errors of

greatest legacy

the British experience

doctrine would be played out

Staff,

I've

significantly tested in

more from lessons learned from

1961 meeting of the Joint Chiefs of

160

One

doctrine that appeared

doctrine derived

it

doctrine traced

However

only after the war, with the benefit of hindsight,

to find connections.

Kennedy,

The

omission than

was

on the

the development and use of CI doctrine. Laos was,

is

failure for

It

little

in

in

in

the

Malaya.

Vietnam.

President Kennedy had told the

Hamilton-Merritt, 355-460, 493-494.
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new

In

a

assembled

officers that

he "[wished]

to

trained for counterguerrilla operations

have the maximum number

and put

into

men

of

areas of immediate

concern..." 161 Most of those men, one
assumes, were military. Since the

President also instituted CI training as a
requirement for promotion to general
officer,

and incorporated CI doctrine

reasonable to conclude that the

into the officer training schools,

officers

who executed

trained using Kennedy's doctrine, probably
by

Laos. Therein

This

is

learned hard lessons

certainly true of

men

McGeorge Bundy, both
ground

those

level,

of

in

John

therefore,

Vietnam were

the administration,

whom

played key roles

who went back

F.

because many

like

of the

same people

in

to

still

to the United States

were

The CIA and Special Forces

been

in

service?

The

often trainers for
soldiers

Who

How well

men

it

was

taught

Star were able to reconcile that dichotomy

is

an important
in

the American passed on the hard lessons of Laos to

Record, "Essential Points Arising From the
President", 23 February 1961, NSF, M&M, CS: Laos, JFKL.
for

111

was

the veterans of

question that bears directly on the success of American CI operations

how well

who

else would have

doctrine these

very different from the operations they had executed.

Momentum and White

Vietnam.

both Laos and Vietnam. At

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, as

had the experience and

Memorandum

in

W.W. Rostow and

soon named, must have been taught by Laos veterans.

Vietnam. But

came

experience

Laos simply applied them next door

in

the next generation of advisors.
transited the

men who's

in

the connection.

lies

Laos becomes important,

who had

the war

seems

it

JCS Meeting

With the

those

who would

another

attempt to win hearts and minds

inquiry.

112

in

Vietnam

is

a subject for
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